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From the Editor...
Welcome to the Fall/ Winter, 2011 issue of the Journal of Transportation Management!
This issue of the Journal contains five articles on various aspects of trucking safety legal issues,
logistics strategy impacts across three cultures, LTL pricing, and airline concentration and aviation
fuel efficiency. The first article is a legal commentary that focuses on the state of safety related legal
affairs in the motor carrier industry, and specifically examines the “duty of reasonable care” doctrine
in light of FMCSA’s administration of CSA. The article goes on to make several recommendations
for shippers and policymakers. The second article examines logistics strategy’s impact on
coordination, customer serv ice and competitive responsiveness across companies in three distinct
countries. The article concludes that the Bowersox/Daugherty typology under study is a useful
approach to examining logistics strategics in different countries.
The third article focuses on LTL pricing and reports on the findings from in-depth interviews of
industry stakeholders on the topic of satisfaction with current LTL pricing approaches. The article
confirms a long held dislike for the current class rate system, finds strong support for changing the
system, and suggests that a density based system is the most likely alternative. The fourth and fifth
articles relate to the aviation industry. The fourth article reports on passenger airline concentration
levels and summarizes increasing levels of concentration since deregulation. The article goes on to
report on evidence of industry economies of scale and discusses the implications of such economies.
The final article examines the role that fuel efficiency can play in providing competitive advantage in
the aviation industry. The article concludes that competitive advantage can be particularly powerful
if a culture of fuel efficiency can be embedded in the organization.
At the Journal, we are continuing to make a number of changes that will improve the visibility of
JTM, and improve its position in the supply chain publishing world. These include registering and
updating journal information with several publishing guides, placing the journal eontent with the
EBSCO, Gale and JSTOR databases faculty have access to, and plaeing abstracts of all past journal
articles on an open area of the Delta Nu Alpha Journal web page. We are in the process of uploading
all past issues to these various sites. Full journal article PDF’s continue to be available to
subscribers on the web page at www.deltanualpha.org with the password: dnadcducation.
I look forward to hearing from you our readers with questions, comments and article submissions.
The submission guidelines are included at the end of this issue’s articles and I encourage both
academics and practitioners to consider submitting an article to the Journal. Also included in this
Issue is a subscription form and 1 hope you will subscribe personally, and/or encourage your libraries
to subscribe.
John C. Taylor, Ph D.
Editor, Journal of Transportation Management
Chairman, Department of Marketing and
Supply Chain Management
School of Business Administration
Wayne State University

A COMMENTARY:
THE PERFECT STORM: SCHRAMM DECISION, FMCSA, AND AN IMPOSIBLE DUTY
FOR BROKERS AND THIRD PARTY LOGISTICS COMPANIES
Paul Stewart
Attorney at Law
ABSTRACT
Over the last thirty years, there never has been a more confused doctrine than the current “duty of
reasonable care” faced by transportation brokers, third-party logistics companies and shippers as they
select carriers for transport. The confusion in what was once reasonable and well understood law has
been fueled by a perfect storm of judicial reasoning with misplaced reference to faulty empirical
data, the complete failure of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to properly
assess carrier safety worthiness, a feeding frenzy by the plaintiffs’ bar and apathy by many in the
industry. The purpose of this commentary is to examine how this uncertainty developed, to identify
some of the more glaring issues that must be addressed, and to give some possible guidance as to
how the industry, FMCSA and courts should proceed to clarify the duty of a broker in complying
with “reasonable care” in selecting carriers.
INTRODUCTION
During thirty years as a transportation attorney,
general counsel to three third-party logistics
companies and former CEO of a logistics
company, there never has been a more confused
doctrine than the current “duty of reasonable
care” faced by transportation brokers, third-party
logistics companies and shippers as they select
carriers for transport. The confusion in what
was once reasonable and well understood law
has been fueled by a perfect storm of judicial
reasoning with misplaced reference to faulty
empirical data, the complete failure of the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) to properly assess carrier safety
worthiness, a feeding frenzy by the plaintiffs’ bar
and apathy by many in the industry in the face of
some potentially serious challenges to the future
of competition in both the carrier and broker
sectors of the industry.

The purpose of this commentary is to examine
how this uncertainty developed, to identify some
of the more glaring issues that must be
addressed, and to give some possible guidance
as to how the industry, FMCSA and courts
should proceed to clarify the duty of a broker in
complying with the “reasonable care” standard
for selecting carriers.
Since the inception of the property broker
concept, brokers have for the most part been
held to a very limited duty of reasonable care
and diligent inquiry in the selection of carriers
for transport. As will be shown, the wisdom of
fifty years of state and federal courts construing
this duty to be limited is much more wellfounded than the more recent and patently
unsound extensions of this duty, requiring
brokers to be an ombudsman of safety
determinations in lieu of the FMCSA.1 *For all of
the twentieth century a broker’s duty with slight
exception was usually construed to mean that

1 SeeChubb Group of Insurance Companies v. H.A. Transportation Systems, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D. Cal.
2002); CGU Int 7 Ins., PTC v. Keystone Lines Corp. , 2004 WL 1047982. *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2004); Schramm v.
Foster, 341 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2004); Jones v. C lI. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. 558 F. Supp. 2d 630.
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brokers had to confirm that carriers they hired
satisfied the following requirements:

ANALYSIS
I.

1. Authorized by what is now the FMCSA;
2. Had regulatory mandated minimum
insurance coverage; and
3. Were competent insofar as any knowledge
the broker had or with reasonable care could
ascertain.2
Perhaps the Foster case' in 1969 was the first
real inroad into a broader duty by brokers. It
was clearly a precedent for some of the very
vague, ambiguous and judicial activist reasoning
and extremely poor direction by the Maryland
district court in the Schramm case. The Schramm
case, and its mandate that brokers/third party
logistics companies must look to a data base
(FMCSA’s Safety Status Measurement System,
“SafeStat”) that was full of error, and invalid as
a predictor of carrier safety worthiness, pivoted
off of Foster. It required that brokers look to a
source that could only create continued
confusion for brokers and shippers, since both
the SafeStat system and its successor, Safety
Management System (SMS), have been shown
to provide misleading and incomplete
information from which it is virtually impossible
to determine carrier safety worthiness, as will be
more thoroughly discussed herin.
If one is to properly address the current enigma
faced by brokers in their “new’' duty of
reasonable care in selecting carriers, decision
makers must understand how the fallacy of this
new duty was developed, with some hope that a
better understanding of this unfortunate rule of
law will be completely corrected.

The Foster case involved a shipper (Foster) who
had selected a carrier that was involved in an
automobile accident in which persons were
seriously injured, after the brakes on the carrier’s
truck failed. Plaintiffs, in addition to statutory
and regulatory infractions that are not pertinent,
alleged that the broker was negligent for
selecting “...an incompetent and careless
contractor (carrier)”. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reasoned first that the evidence was
insufficient to hold that Foster could have
known of prior acts of negligence by the carrier
of such number or magnitude to have found the
carrier to be incompetent or careless. They also
found that Foster had no actual knowledge of
cither poor reputation or lack of authority on the
part of the carrier.*4 5
Had the Court stopped there, as they should
have, the ambiguous reasoning and inexplicable
duties for brokers pronounced in the Schramm
(2004) case perhaps would never have been
visited upon the truck brokerage industry. The
Foster (1969) court could have followed the
conclusion reached in Mooney v. Stainless, Inc, a
1964 case out of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.1
... we believe the better rule to be that in
order to render an employer liable under
the theory of negligent selection of an
independent contractor in cases such as
the one at bar, it is necessary to establish
that, at the time of hiring, the employer
had either actual or constructive
knowledge that the independent
contractor was incompetent.6

2 L.B. Foster Company v. Hurnhlad, 418 F. 2d 727, 730 (9th C’ir. 1969)
3Id.
4 Foster, at 730, 731.
5 338 F. 2d 127 (6lh Cir. 1964)
6 Id. at 131
8
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The Foster Case and 1 low it Was Bad Law
and a Faulty Foundation for Schramm

In addition, the mere fact that an independent
contractor might subsequently engage in a
negligent act raises no presumption that the
employer was negligent in selecting the
independent contractor for the job.7
Instead, as in so many cases where it seems that
legal reasoning is replaced with the purpose of
sustaining a sympathy verdict, the Foster court
found that where direct evidence of negligence is
missing, a jury can infer negligence by a
. .carrier’s or transportation broker’s lack of
experience, poor financial condition, failure to
respect certificate requirements, and willingness
to do business at cut rates.”8 From this premise,
notwithstanding a total lack of affirmative proof
of incompetence, or prior negligence, the Court
went on to find that Foster “...failed to make a
reasonable inquiry as to [the carrier’s]
competence.”9
If we are to understand the fallacy of the new
duty of due care placed upon brokers by the
Schramm court (and courts that have followed),
we must first realize that Foster was the only
case cited by Schramm as a premise for the
“new” duty of reasonable care and standard for
“reasonable inquiry”. Also, since the Foster
case was apparently the first court decision to
supplant direct evidence of prior knowledge of
carrier negligence with inference of negligence
based upon the business acumen and financial
sufficiency of the carrier, we must test that logic
against our own fair analysis, before moving on
to the failure of the Schramm court’s reasoning
in establishing an impossible standard of care.
Return to Foster, and recall that the Foster court
found no direct evidence of negligence by the
shipper in selecting the carrier, but ruled instead

that negligence could be inferred by the shipper
failing to make reasonable inquiry into the
. .carrier’s or transportation broker’s lack of
experience, poor financial condition, failure to
respect certificate requirements, and willingness
to do business at cut rates.”10 Assume arguendo
that a broker finds a carrier for which he knows
of no prior negligence or incompetence. The
broker then finds that the carrier has the
following characteristics:
1. The carrier is new and may have the
best drivers and equipment in the
business, but because the carrier is
new, there exists a “lack of
experience”.
2. Has some weak financials, as all start
ups and many solid performance
carriers do, thus is currently in “poor
financial condition”.
3. I las certificates of authority that may
be conditional because they are new,
or may have lapsed because of
administrative inefficiency.
4. Is willing to cut rates in order to gain
business, as will many very safe
carriers who have a “willingness to do
business at cut rates”.
Assume further that the broker contracts with
this carrier to deliver a load, knowing of no prior
acts of negligence and finding that the carrier is
not rated as “Unsatisfactory” by the FMCSA.
After the carrier accepts the load, there is a
horrible accident caused by the driver falling
asleep. For the broker in our hypothetical, and
the entire broker industry, how can any of the
standards put forward by the Foster case help, or
fairly be considered, in looking for the
proximate cause of this accident, or finding that

Mooney, at 131. citing Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Johnson, 386 P. 2d 698 (Alaska); Strickland u State. 13
\lisc.2d 925. 1 ~!1 N.Y.S.2d 983: Ever v. Ilehnar, 272 Mich. 513. 262 N.W. 298: Silveus r. Grossman. 307 Pa. 212. 161
A. 362: 27 Am.Jur (Independent Contractors) 509
8 Foster, supra at 730
9 Id. at 731.
1°Id.
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the selection of the carrier by the broker was
negligent. The answer is that such standards are
of highly subjective quality and couldn’t
possibly be helpful in the absence of direct proof
of broker negligence. However, when courts
allow juries to infer negligence from such weak
logic, juries will too often create a path to a
sympathetic verdict. Such standards are
contradictions of sound judicial reasoning,
which have in the past required direct evidence
that the broker had actual or constructive
knowledge that the carrier was incompetent,
before attributing to the broker culpability for
negligent hiring.
The Foster court cited no authority for their
highly subjective standard for reasonable
inquiry. As in most bad law, they reasoned
backward to reach their result, by giving us a
checklist of business acumen, rather than a solid
inquiry standard. The suggested list of criteria
for an inference of negligence is immediately
exposed as fallacious when made a part of the
following:
• All carriers having poor financials and
willing to do business at cut rates are
negligent
• Carrier “A” has never had an accident
until now, has poor financials, lack of
experience and is willing to do business
at cut rates.
m Therefore, Carrier “A” must be
negligent.
One does not have to be an expert in argument
form to see how this syllogism stands out as
invalid. Further, other courts have considered
this very argument and correctly found that
business acumen and financial responsibility
have no place in such analysis.

As to the first point, we reject the notion
that financial irresponsibility is cither
equivalent to or a category of
incompetence. Cassano v. Aschoff.’ 226
N.J.Super. 110, 116.543 A.2d 973.
certif. denied, 113 N.J. 371, 550 A.2d
476 (1988): see also Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 411 comment g
(1965) (“The rule stated in this Section
makes the employer responsible only for
his failure to exercise reasonable care to
employ a contractor who is competent
and careful. It has no application where
the contractor, although competent... is
financially irresponsible.”).11
Equating lack of insurance and financial
responsibility with incompetence might
also wreak havoc in particular
industries, such as transportation,
because persons or entities contracting
for transportation services would be
required to make continuing inquiry into
the financial qualifications of the
contractor.12 [emphasis added]
Foster was bad law. Howcver, it was clearly the
faulty foundation for worse law by the Schramm
court, thirty-four years later. Both Foster and
Schramm are seemingly examples of how bad
law is often created by courts looking for social
justice where a tragic accident has occurred, or
reaching too far in creating a duty that has not
heretofore existed. They both remind us of
Justice Holmes’ often mis-paraphrased
comment, “Great cases like hard cases make bad
law. For great cases are called great, not by
reason of their real importance in shaping the
law of the future, but because of some accident
of immediate overwhelming interest which
appeals to the feelings and distorts the
j udgment.”13

11 Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 153 N.J. 117. 707 A.2d 977 (N.J.. 1998).
12 Id. at 139, citing Robinson v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co, 4 F 3d 237 at 242.
13 Northern Securities Co. v. United States 193 U.S. 197,400-401.
10
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II. The Schramm Court Rules that Brokers
Must Reference an Invalid Database
(SafeStat).
The Schramm case, involved an accident in the
state of Maryland, caused when the carrier failed
to stop at an intersection and plaintiffs’
automobile collided with the carrier’s vehicle.
Injuries to the plaintiffs were catastrophic and
permanent. The Maryland District Court
considered a motion for summary judgment and
granted all parts of the motion, except for that
part relating to negligent hiring of the carrier by
the broker. With the seed of illogical “reasonable
inquiry” planted by Foster, what followed was
the sine qua non for the Schramm court to give
us the new and intractable duty for transportation
brokers:
This duty to use reasonable care in the
selection of carriers includes, at least,
the subsidiary duties (1) to check the
safety statistics and evaluations of the
carriers with whom it contracts
available on the SafeStat database
maintained by FMSCA, [italics mine]
and (2) to maintain internal records of
the persons with whom it contracts to
assure that they are not manipulating
their business practices in order to avoid
unsatisfactory SafeStat ratings.14
Perhaps the Schramm court was looking at least
in part for a more objective standard of
reasonable inquiry than what they saw in the
Foster decision. Perhaps they saw the same
inadequacy in such a business acumen test as
demonstrated here. However, they unknowingly
resorted to requirements that could not produce a
more reliable result when followed. In fairness
to the Schramm court, they apparently did not
know that their effort at a more objective
standard of reasonable care was doomed by the

completely inadequate authority they chose for
inquiry into carrier safety, i.e., ”... the SafeStat
database maintained by FMSCA.”
In fact, these “subsidiary duties” were on the day
announced counterproductive to any notion of
improving the process of selecting safe carriers.
Furthermore, the sanction of such a useless
process by a federal district court both greatly
confused the former duty of reasonable care for
transportation brokers, and at the same time
allowed FMCSA to further avoid its duty to be
the one and only entity to administer, evaluate
and determine carrier safety worthiness.
Consider the first “subsidiary duty” announced
by the district court:
“(1) to check the safety statistics and
evaluations of the carriers with whom it
contracts available on the SafeStat
database maintained by FMSCA.” 15
To scrutinize fairly the rationale by which the
Schramm court pronounced this duty, one must
ask: What would the broker in the Schramm
case have found had they looked carefully at
SafeStat, prior to selecting the carrier involved
in the ensuing accident? The accident and
concomitant duties of the broker which were the
subject of the court’s analysis occurred on May
2, 2002, and the court’s decision was announced
August 24, 2004. For the interim period between
the date of the accident and the court’s analysis
requiring brokers to look to the SafeStat system,
the U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of
Inspector General reported the following on
February 13, 2004:
1. Of 645,551 active interstate carriers
on record, only 26 percent had
sufficient data represented to
compute a value for one or more of
the four safety evaluation areas.

14 Schramm at 551. citing Foster, supra.
15 Schramm, supra
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2. One-third of crash reports, including
37,000 crashes involving interstate
carriers, were missing from the
FMCSA’s database.
3. As of January, 2003, 42 percent of
the reporting on active carriers
contained outdated data.
4. For the fiscal year 2002, the average
time in which to upload crash data
on carriers took 158 days.
5. Thirteen percent of the 21,000
crashes and over 70,000 of the
inspection transactions occurring in
our 6-month sample period contained
carrier identification errors, such as
failure to identify a carrier associated
with the violation, or in a smaller
number of instances, identifying the
wrong carrier.
6. In an estimated 11 percent of the
inspection errors the wrong carrier
was held accountable for the SafeStat
related violation.
7. Problems with the inaccurate data are
compounded because no effective
system is in place now to facilitate
the correction of errors in data
reporting.
8. Missing crash reports may place a
lower risk carrier in a deficient
category because data for a higher
risk carrier is not included in the
calculation.
9. The effectiveness of the SafeStat
scoring and ranking calculations is
highly dependent on the quality of
the crash data file, which in the past
was missing a substantial number of
reportable crashes.
10. If public dissemination of SafeStat
results is to continue, the data must
meet a higher standard. The types
and magnitude of data problems we

found argue for immediate and
effective action.16
Perhaps the Schramm court was somehow ruling
on insufficient or poorly presented evidence, or
took unfounded rationale without precedent
from briefs by the parties, but for unknown
reasons and no proven prior validity, the court
created a “subsidiary duty” sui generis, that was,
by objective facts then available, contrary to any
notion of best practice. Moreover, this newly
announced duty made it mandatory for brokers
to look to a source (SafeStat) that had been
found to be unreliable by the Inspector General’s
office six months before the Schramm decision
was published. In fact, the Inspector General’s
report was clearly saying that the data was
incomplete, invalid as an indicator of accurate
reporting on carriers and recommending that the
SafeStat site be taken out of public view and use
months before the Schramm court mandated its
use.
Seemingly, the Schramm court was desperate for
an empirical source to which brokers and other
shippers could turn and get a clear indication of
the safety worthiness of carriers. They
apparently assumed far greater validity for the
information to be found on SafeStat than existed.
With all of the information that was available at
the time of their decision, they either knew or
should have known that SafeStat was anything
but a failsafe source of carrier safety evaluation.
Still, inexplicably, they created a standard that
was immediately incapable of confirming
“reasonable care” or “diligent inquiry”, since the
source to which the court directed brokers could
not possibly provide completely valid
information, and thus, absolutely could not be
reliable, by definition.
(The reader is invited to test this conclusion
against any of the ten findings mentioned above

16 U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General: Executive Summary Audit Report No. MH2004-034. February 13. 2004; http://\v\v\v.oin.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/mh2004034.pdf
12
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in the Inspector General’s audit of 2004; e. g., if
11 percent of the inspection errors were
attributed to the wrong carrier, how may we
reliably make any determination as to the carrier
we are researching? If 74% of the registered
carriers did not have sufficient data represented,
how was the broker in Schramm to know with
reliability whether the carrier they were
researching was among them? If in 11 percent
of the inspection errors the wrong carrier was
held accountable for the SafeStat violation, how
was the broker to know whether the carrier they
were researching was among these wrongfully
charged with a violation.)
All indications of the unreliable nature of
SafeStat continued to mount from the time of the
Schramm decision. By 2007, the Inspector
General made the following findings and
recommendations:
•

•

•

•

We found that, although improvements
have been made, problems still exist
with the reporting of crash data.
Completeness of data is critical for
SafeStat because scoring involves a
relative safety ranking of one carrier
against other carriers competing for the
same business.
Missing crash reports may place a lower
risk carrier in a deficient category
because data for a higher risk carrier is
not included in the calculation.
Consequently, FMCSA should continue
to limit public use until it can assess
whether significant crash reporting
problems remain.
Before FMCSA allows public access to
SafeStat scores, it must improve its
ability to measure the completeness of
non-fatal crash reporting.17

Shortly after the Inspector General reported this
information to Congress; on February 21, 2008,
the FMCSA put the following disclaimer (in
part) on the SafeStat website:
“Caution Urged in the Use of SafeStat Data”
The message that followed this notice included a
description of how information was reported to
the FMCSA and problems with variation in that
data reporting. The description was summarized
with this statement:
“Accordingly, SafeStat’s ability to
accurately and objectively assess the
safety fitness of individual motor carriers
may be inconsistent and not conclusive
without additional analysis. " [emphasis
added]
This announcement confirming the invalidity of
the SafeStat information on carriers was then
followed by this boldfaced disclaimer:
WARNING
Because of State data variations,
FMCSA cautions those who seek to use
SafeStat data analysis system in ways
not intended by FMCSA. Please be
aware that use of SafeStat for purposes
other than identifying and prioritizing
carriers for FMCSA and state safety
improvement and enforcement programs
may produce unintended results and not
be suitable for certain uses.18
In the same year that the Schramm decision was
published, the Inspector General’s Office
concluded that SafeStat was no longer a valid
measurement device for carrier safety
worthiness: “FMCSA must act to revalidate the
SafeStat model because changes have occurred

U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General: Letter from Inspector Genera! Scoval to
Congressman Petri with attached Briefing, June 19, 2007; http://wMW.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/
SAFESTAT.PDF

18 FMCSA, Safety Measurement System, http://ai. fmesa.dot, gov/SMS/
Fall/Wintcr 2011
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since the 1998 study that supported the model’s
validity.”19 20
The Schramm court established a rule of law that
was clearly wrong on the date it was announced.
No clear and reliable safety determination was
available to the broker in Schramm had they “...
check[ed] the safety statistics and evaluations of
the carriers with whom it contracts available on
the SafeStat database maintained by FMSCA”,
nor was one available to all the brokers
henceforth that have been irresponsibly
burdened by this decision, which is inexplicable
except for the motive of reaching a social justice
decision. The FMCSA reporting function that
had been a failure since its inception in 1999,
was a failure prior to and on the date of the
Schramm decision, and continues to be a failure
to this day, even its present form known as
Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010 (CSA
2010), Safety Management System (SMS), as
later developed here.
In summary, the SafeStat measurement system of
carrier safety was invalid and unreliable at the
time of the ruling in Schramm. Flowever, due to
a lack of a careful and cogent analysis, courts
and court decisions have continued to allow
juries to consider the incredulous notion that
brokers should have looked to the SafeStat
system for information on carriers as a part of
their duty of reasonable care in selecting a
carrier.-10 Perhaps more important, the unusual
mandate by a federal court, giving specific
direction to such an unreliable source, has been
accepted as procedure that must be followed by
many who counsel transportation brokers on risk
management, and cottage industries have been
created to look for and evaluate information that
is by any definition unreliable.

III. FMCSA Replaces Safcr/SafeStat with
Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010
(CSA 2010) and the Safety Management
System (SMS).
The problems with SafeStat and continued
public outcry, along with Congressional
oversight and pressure, resulted in the FMCSA
announcing the agency function that was to
replace SafeStat as a carrier safety measurement
system. In their Five-Year Plan for 2006-2011,
the agency provided the first description of
CSA-2010:
The intent of CSA 2010 is to establish an
operational model that will determine
the relative safety fitness risk attributable
to every motor carrier and develop
streamlined approaches to change the
behavior of poor motor carrier
operations and their drivers. The CSA
2010 will ultimately provide FMCSA a
new modern-operational model that will
greatly enhance the Agency’s efficiency
at gathering and properly evaluating a
greater proportion of the regulated
population.21
This intent was followed by the rollout of the
CSA 2010 Operational Model, in December,
2010, with the following stated purpose: “CSA
re-engineers the former enforcement and
compliance process to provide a better view into
how well large commercial motor vehicle
carriers and drivers are complying with safety
rules, and to intervene earlier with those who are
not.”22
Since the inception of CSA 2010 and the SMS
measurement categories for carrier safety, this

19 Executive Summary Audit Report, supra, p. iv. (2004).
20 See, Jones v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. 558 F. Supp. 2d 630.
21 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, FMCSA Strategic Plan 2006-2011. http://www.tmcsa.dot.tzov/fmesastrategic-plan-102907.htm
22 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, CSA - Compliance, Safety, Accountability, website http://
csa. fmesa. dot, cov/about/csa how, aspx
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new alternative has also been found to be invalid
and unreliable for sueh a purpose. The
foundation for the conclusion that this
measurement system is also invalid and
unreliable for the purpose of determining carrier
safety with reasonable certainty includes the
following:
1. Anne Ferro, Administrator, FMCSA,
stated before Congress that the
FMCSA will replace SafeStat with
the Safety Management System
(SMS), and that the Agency can rate
only between two and three percent
of the carrier population annually.23
2. Because of skewed data and
disproportionate impact on carriers,
the National Association of Small
Trucking Companies (NASTC), ct al.
filed suit against the FMCSA on
November 29, 2010, seeking a stay
on the implementation of SMS and
its ostensible measurements of
carrier safety (Behavior Analysis and
Safety Improvement Categories
“BASICS’').24
3. In a settlement agreement between
NASTC, et.al., and FMCSA, on
March 4, 2011, the FMCSA, agreed
to publish a disclaimer on the SMS
website, admitting that,
Readers should not draw
conclusions about a carrier’s
ov erall safety condition simply
based on the data displayed in the
system [emphasis added] Unless a
motor carrier in the SMS has received

an UNSATISFACTORY, safety rating
pursuant to 49 CFR Part 385, or has
otherwise been ordered to discontinue
operations by FMCSA, it is
authorized to operate on the nation’s
roadways.25
4.During the twelve months that SMS
has been used by FMCSA to evaluate
carrier safety, there have been
numerous database changes, with the
following noted as deficiencies in
fairly rating all carriers within the
test states:
• Only 11 percent of regulated carriers
have any scores.
• Crash data includes both preventable
and non-preventable accidents. Less
than 4 percent of regulated carriers
have crash data included.
• “Unsafe driving” scores are recorded
only in conjunction with roadside
inspections, and measure only 4.8
percent of the regulated carriers.
• The “fatigued driving” BASIC
measures only 2.5 percent of the
regulated carriers.
• “Vehicle maintenance” measures
only 9 percent of the industry.
• “Driver fitness” measures only 2
pcrcentof the industry. Most points
are accumulated for drivers not
having medical cards in their
possession - not for actual
disqualifying medical conditions.26
Sueh uncertainty and lack of validity to critical
mass measurement of all regulated carriers has
led to concern by financial institutions and the
capital markets invested in the transportation

; Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure Subcommittee On I lighways And Transit U.S. House Of
Representatives; Statement ofAnne S. Ferro, Administrator, FMCSA;, June 23, 2010; http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/about/
ne\vs/speeches/Statement-of-Anne-S-Ferro0623 I O.aspx
24 National Association of Small Trucking Companies, et al. v. FMCSA (D.C. C'ir. No. 10-1402)
25 Id., Settlement Agreement, March 4, 2011. Document ID: 1297064
26 U.S. Department of Transportation. Paul E Green and Daniel Blower. Evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model
Test, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, FMCSA-RRA-11-019 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2011),
p. 27.
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industry. One such company, Wells Fargo
Securities, LLC, completed a thorough statistical
analysis and reported their findings on
November 4, 2011,
In fact, according to our analysis of the
200 largest carriers in the CSA
database, we find no meaningful
statistical relationship between actual
accident frequency and BASIC scores
for Unsafe Driving, Fatigued Driving or
Driver Fitness... we feel BASIC scores
should not be used exclusively in
assessing carrier risk and that they may,
in fact, provide misleading
information.27
Unfortunately, since the installation of CSA
2010 and its measurement devices for carrier
safety contained within the SMS; brokers,
shippers and carriers are left with another
unreliable measurement system for carrier safety.
While CSA 2010 and its measurement system,
SMS, are the successors to SafeStat, no court has
yet been required to rule on whether brokers
have the duty to look to the carrier safety
information within SMS. However, brokers
operate daily under the threat of vicarious
liability should they fail to follow the mandate of
the Schramm Court, and A. .check the safety
statistics and evaluations of the carriers with
whom it contracts available on the SafeStat
database maintained by FMSCA.”28 29
Never has a court offered any more meaningless
and completely counterproductive direction.
The paranoia and complete uncertainty
surrounding the “new” duty of reasonable care
for brokers in selecting carriers should never
have come to be. It was originated by bad
analysis, and over-reaching judicial direction to

an invalid source of inquiry. The complete
impossibility of this new duty of care has been
exacerbated, rather than alleviated, by the
bandwagon tendency for some who advise
brokers to parrot the Schramm decision, and
advise that brokers must “... check the safety
statistics and evaluations of the carriers with
whom it contracts available on the SafeStat
database maintained by FMSCA”. Rhetorically,
and in fact, we must ask: To find what, exactly,
which might be reliable?
It was bad advice when originated by the
Schramm Court, for all the reasons outlined
herein, and it is bad advice today. In light of all
the information that has been generated and even
the admissions of the FMCSA, for brokers to
originate and perpetuate a business process that
requires them “...to check the safety statistics
and evaluations of the carriers with whom [they]
contract...” on either the former SafeStat
system, or its successor, the SMS, amounts to
drinking the proverbial Kool-Aid. A better
argument could perhaps be made that it is
negligence per se for brokers to make a
judgment about the safety worthiness of carriers
from what has been demonstrated to be
unreliable and certainly incomplete information
currently found on the SMS. They will never be
able to substantiate diligent inquiry by referring
to bits and pieces of unreliable data.
How can such an inquiry satisfy any meaningful
duty of due care, when the FMCSA directly
contradicts such advice on the SMS website with
their very clear disclaimer, “Readers should not
draw' conclusions about a carrier's overall
safety’ condition simply based on the data
displayed in the system."2'’ Further, as if the
disclaimer is not enough, FMCSA adds in its
explanation of what SMS is, and is not, “[t]he
SMS results displayed on the SMS website are

27 CSA: Good Intentions, Unclear Outcomes; Anthony Gallo, CFA, Senior Analyst; Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Equity
Research Department, November 4, 2011
2S Schramm , supra
29 FMCSA. Safety Management System, http:/'ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SMS/Data/
carrier.aspx?enc^KxcVSWt’Ecav9s9SnBUikeRZBvr+pUdovFGgZJQl 8\vi>s~
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not intended to imply any federal safety rating of
the carrier pursuant to 49 USC 31144.,m
[emphasis added] That being so, we must ask
was there ever any valid reason for brokers being
sent into this nightmare of "checking safety
statistics and evaluations of carriers”? The
answer is clearly, no! It resulted from bad law
and lack of understanding of just how
completely invalid the information was at the
bottom of the rabbit hole chosen by the
Schramm Court.
IV. How Must This Folly Be Corrected?
By different means and methods, a strong
consensus must be achieved by both courts and
Congress that the FMCSA is the only entity
charged with determining the relative safety of
commercial carriers. The nonsense must end.
Laypersons must not be charged with looking at
experimental and, so far, invalid tools in a futile
effort to somehow document “diligent inquiry”
from information that by definition is unreliable
as an indicator of current and complete
information on all carriers (and therefore, on the
carrier they are researching).
Congressional oversight of the FMCSA has been
lacking in requiring of FMCSA proper
accountability for their primary responsibility, at
least since the introduction of the SafeStat
system in 1999. No further Inspector General
audits and warnings should be required before
the FMCSA is either to admit that their
responsibility cannot be achieved by current
means, or completely sanction the rating of all
carriers for which they have not made a
determination of “UNSATISFACTORY”,
consistent with their own construction of their
duty,

Unless a motor carrier in the SMS has
received an UNSATISFACTORY, safety
rating pursuant to 49 CFR Part 385, or
has otherwise been ordered to
discontinue operations by FMCSA, it is
authorized to operate on the nation’s
roadways.30
31
There is in this advisory an immediate dilemma
for FMCSA if they, or the courts, suggest that
brokers should not be limited in their duty of
diligent inquiry to relying exclusively upon a
search for an “Unsatisfactory” rating, or not. To
suggest that a broker, with limited resources,
must look into the maze of unreliable
information, or infer relative safety from
BASICs that may be distorted for all the reasons
discussed herein, is to say that the broker (and
the public) cannot rely upon FMCSA to
authorize only safe carriers. Courts should in the
future be reluctant to hold a broker, with limited
understanding and reasons to believe that SMS
data may be unreliable, culpable for selecting a
carrier that has been authorized by FMCSA,
with their vast investment in measurement
systems with which to designate carriers as
“authorized”.
Title 49, U.S.Code § 31 144, requires the
Secretary of Transportation (delegated to
FMCSA per 49 CFR 385) to:
(1)

determine whether an owner or
operator is fit to operate safely
commercial motor vehicles, utilizing
among other things the accident record
of an owner or operator operating in
interstate commerce and the accident
record and safety inspection record of
such owner or operator -

(2) periodically update such safety
fitness determinations;

30 SMS Information Center, What is the Motor Carrier Safety Management System (SMS)?, http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/
SMS/InfoCenter/default.aspx#question 1.
31 SMS Website, supra
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(3) make such final safety fitness
determinations readily available to
the public;

These helpful distinctions are made at 49 C.F.R.
§ 385.3 Definitions and acronyms:

• Safety fitness determination means the
There is no reasonable construction of this
final determination by FMCSA that a
statutory language that would impose upon
motor carrier meets the safety fitness
shippers, brokers and third-party logistics
standard under §385.5
companies the duty of determining whether a
• Safety' rating or rating means a rating of
carrier is safe. That is a statutory duty of the
“Satisfactory”, “Conditional” or
Department of Transportation, through the
“Unsatisfactory ”, which the FMCSA
offices of their administrative agency, the
assigns to a motor carrier using the
FMCSA. There is no statutory or regulatory
factors prescribed in § 385.7
authority for the FMCSA to delegate this
responsibility to members of the public who
FMCSA database measurement tools such as the
must choose a motor carrier from those
former SafeStat, or the current SMS, are not
registered with the FMCSA. There is no
safety' fitness determinations or safety ratings.
statutory or regulatory authority that allows a
They are measurement tools that remain under
SafeStat or SMS measurement category (i.e.,
development toward validity and reliability.
“BASICs”) to be used as a “safety rating” in lieu
They should be viewed as such in the future by
of the procedure prescribed by 49 CFR 385,
courts considering the admissibility of such
which by regulation mandates the statutory duty
uncertain data. While they are under
of the FMCSA to “make such final safety fitness
development, and until completely valid, they
determinations readily available to the public;”32 33 should not be viewed by the public in lieu of or
49 C.F.R. § 385.1 Purpose and Scope, provides:
(a) This part establishes FMCSA’s
procedures to determine the safety fitness
of motor carriers, to assign safety> ratings,
to direct motor carriers to take remedial
action when required, and to prohibit
motor carriers determined to be unfit
from operating a CMV. [emphasis added]
If we are to understand the confusion that has
been created by the FMCSA and exacerbated by
some courts, we must understand the difference
between this clear statutory duty and what has
resulted by years of FMCSA focus on safety
management controls, as a means of achieving
the ultimate objective and statutory duty to
provide ‘ final safety' fitness determinations ”n,
i.e., assign safety ratings.

32 49 U.S. Code § 31144 (3)
33 Id.
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in search of a statutorily required safety rating.
[emphasis added]
The former SafeStat and current SMS
measurement categories have been proven to be
nothing more than incomplete attempts to gather
metrics with which the FMCSA can make fitness
determinations and safety ratings. THEY ARE
NOT COMPLETED SAFETY RATINGS! It
follows that when such tools are of questionable
validity and reliability, they should be kept from
the public view, rather than be mistakenly
designated by courts as sources to which brokers
must look. To do so would avoid the many dire
consequences brought about by misleading the
shipping public, and the courts that have
misguidedly given these invalid tools
undeserved credence as part of common law
duties.

A. Suggested Congressional Action
The FMCSA has completely failed to fulfill the
statutory and regulatory duty of providing to the
public accurate and timely safety ratings on all
registered carriers. This failure is glaring and
complete, since the inception of the FMCSA in
1999. There has never been a time, since the
inception of the FMCSA, that they have been
able to publish a “final safety fitness
determination” for all, or even a significant
portion of the active interstate motor carriers.
As of December 23, 2011, the FMCSA reports:
• 792,704 active interstate motor
carriers, with 118,327 (14.92%) of
these having a safety rating of cither
Satisfactory, Conditional, or
Unsatisfactory.
• 338,380 For Hire interstate motor
carriers, with 61,067 (18%) of these
having a safety rating of either
Satisfactory, Conditional, or
Unsatisfactory
• 454,324 Private interstate motor
carriers, with 57,260 (12.6%) of
these having a safety rating of either
Satisfactory, Conditional, or
Unsatisfactory34
Since Administrator Anne Ferro states that the
FMCSA can only rate two or three percent of the
motor carriers annually35, it is unknown how
many of these are current, but by mathematical
certainty, many are so old they are meaningless
as far as current safety worthiness. While
spending $45 million on CSA 2010 since 2007,
and requesting $78 million for 2012,36 the
FMCSA has created new measurement
categories for "intervention” (of questionable
validity and reliability), but has not created a

system that can give a definitive and final Safety
Rating on all registered carriers. Their delegated
duty, under 49 U.S. Code § 31144, is to
“determine whether an owner or operator is fit to
operate safely commercial motor vehicles...”,
and to, “make such final safety fitness
determinations readily available to the public”,
[emphasis added]
The FMCSA claims, “The CSA 2010 will
ultimately provide FMCSA a new modemoperational model that will greatly enhance the
Agency’s efficiency at gathering and properly
evaluating a greater proportion of the regulated
population.” Flowever, only 11 percent of
registered carriers had any scores in the CSA
Safety Management System as of August 2011,37
and of those with scores at least one significant
study found, “...no meaningful statistical
relationship between actual accident frequency
and BASIC scores for Unsafe Driving, Fatigued
Driving or Driver Fitness.”38
Congress should focus on clarifying for the
FMCSA exactly what their duties and priorities
should be. At the current pace the FMCSA will
have spent over 120 million dollars on CSA
2010 by the end of budget year 2012, and at best
they have created a data recording system that
has questionable value for predicting carrier
safety for less than twenty percent of the
750,000 registered motor carriers. They still
have no system that accomplishes the rating of
all carriers as either; Satisfactory, Conditional, or
Unsatisfactory. I lowevcr, because of some
confused judicial understanding of exactly what
the SafeStat and SMS measurement systems can
provide, the FMCSA’s continued publication of
SMS BASICs measurements imply to the public,
and to some courts, that such data is valid for

34 FMCSA data base response to Freedom of Information Act inquiry, December 23, 2011.
35 See. Note 22
36 United States Government Accountability Office; Susan Fleming Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues; Report to
Congress, February 25, 2011; GAO-11-416R
37 Evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test, supra
38 Wells Fargo, supra.
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evaluating a clear determination of carrier safety.
It simply is not.
Congress must recognize FMCSA’s clear failure
to provide final and timely Safety Ratings on all
registered motor carriers, and that within the
context of this failure they have caused courts
and the shipping public to be confused and
burdened as to a reasonable and fair process for
determining the safety worthiness of authorized
motor carriers. As a first step in correcting this
failure they should require FMCSA to remove
from public view the developmental data
(BASICs) now being displayed within the SMS.
By FMCSA’s own admission, its visibility and
decisions made there from may have unintended
consequences. Removing this data from public
view will also relieve brokers and the shipping
public from the mistaken judicial inference that
such data is a reliable source for a final Safety
Rating. Finally, and most import, requiring the
FMCSA to remove this incomplete
“intervention” data disabuses the notion that
brokers and other shippers should have a duty to
refer to it as a part of their diligent inquiry and
duty of reasonable care.
Once such data is removed from public view,
FMCSA may continue to develop it to a point of
reliability and perhaps increased efficiency in
performing their duty to provide final safety
determinations and safety ratings on all
registered carriers. In the interim, Congress, the
transportation industry, shipping public and
courts should not get confused by the FMCSA’s
apparent effort to rationalize and obfuscate their
failure to fulfill their statutory and regulatory
duty to provide to the public, “... final safety
fitness determinations”39 [emphasis added].
They simply have not done so in their entire
existence.

B. Future Jurisprudence Must Provide a
Duty of Reasonable Care for Brokers
That Corrects the Imputed Duty to Refer
to an Invalid Data Source
As has been demonstrated, the Schramm court
required brokers to refer to a system of carrier
safety evaluation (SafeStat) that was full of error,
invalid and unreliable on the day their decision
was announced. The successor to SafeStat,
SMS, is at best a work in progress and is also
invalid and unreliable as a definitive Safety
Rating on motor carriers. It is clearly disclaimed
as such by its originator, FMCSA.40 Future
litigators, and courts who hear such cases, must
develop a remedial standard of due care for
brokers that eliminates the Hobson’s choice of
being required to refer to the SMS measurement
system for a definitive Safety Rating. For the
vast majority of registered carriers it simply is
not there. If it is there it is of questionable
relevance due to issues of timeliness, errors in
reporting and ratios computed that are
imbalanced with greater weight to larger
carriers.
So much more is known (than at the time of the
Schramm decision) about the likely unreliability
of SMS data that courts should be more inclined
to exclude it as irrelevant, lacking in probative
value, confusing and untrustworthy. The Federal
Rules of Evidence and the corollary state rules,
have many provisions that should be considered
in motions in limine that fully develop the
questionable relevance, probative value,
confusion factor and hearsay nature of many of
the data categories within SMS.
• Fed.R.Evid. 401 says, "Relevant
evidence” means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more

39 Title 49, U.S.Code § 31144(3)
40 FMCSA, Safety Measurement System, http://ai.1mcsa.dot.yov/SMS/
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probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.
• Fed.R.Evid. 403 prov ides that even
relevant information may be excluded if
its probative value is outweighed by a
danger that the evidence could be
confusing, misleading or a waste of the
court’s time.
• Fed.R.Evid. 803 (8) denies the
admission of government reports or data
compilations in civil actions if the
sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.

published acknowledgment that all carriers are
authorized to operate on the nation’s roadways,
unless they have been given an Unsatisfactory
safety rating, is it more or less likely that
presentation of SMS data is both confusing and
untrustworthy under Rule 803 (8)?
It is suggested that more courts should rule as
the Middle District Court of Georgia did when
requested to take judicial notice of safety ratings
published on the former SafeStat, finding that
such data was not reliable evidence routinely
contemplated by the rules governing judicial
notice.42
CONCLUSION

Assume that a broker researches a carrier and
finds proper authority, regulatory insurance in
place and a safety rating other than
Unsatisfactory. The broker concludes that the
carrier is properly authorized by FMCSA, and
the broker has no current knowledge of
incompetence or unsafe operations by the carrier.
The broker knows that the SMS data is
incomplete and that it may contain BASICs data
that is incomplete and outdated, with ratios that
are skewed by large carrier presence, and that a
reputable statistical study concluded “...we find
no meaningful statistical relationship between
actual accident frequency and BASIC scores for
Unsafe Driving, Fatigued Driving or Driver
Fitness”.41

It has been argued herein that brokers and thirdparty logistics companies were for many years
under a reasonable standard of care in selecting
carriers, before the Schramm decision
erroneously required that they refer to a source
(SafeStat) that was invalid and unreliable in
order to meet their duty of diligent inquiry and
reasonable care. Furthermore, for all the reasons
stated herein, the successor to SafeStat,
FMCSA’s Safety Management System, is as
untrustworthy, if not more so.

Is admission of the SMS data, or broker's failure
to look at such data, fairly likely to make it more
or less probable that the broker was negligent?
Given the established unreliability of the former
SafeStat information, and the current state of
confusion regarding SMS measures, is there any
context in which the SMS data should not be
excluded under Rule 403? Given the FMCSA’s
acknowledgement that SMS data is not a safety
rating, but rather for internal intervention
purposes, along with their disclaimers and

With the proven failure of the FMCSA to
provide final safety determinations and safety
ratings for the vast majority of registered motor
carriers, there simply is no definitive source with
which brokers can make a meaningful
determination of carrier safety. They are left
with only a semblance of such a source. They
can do as they have done for many years and
refer to the safety rating provided by the
FMCSA, in those instances where it is available.
If such a rating is not available, surely the broker

V. Conclusion: Returning to a Sensible
Duty of Care for Brokers

41 Wells Fargo, supra
42 See FCCI Ins. Group v. Rodgers Metal Craft. Inc., 2008 WL 4185997 (M.D. Ga. 2008)
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cannot he negligent for failure to infer one from
what has been shown to be unreliable
information.
The FMCSA has clearly failed its statutory duty,
which in turn means that the Department of
Transportation has failed to provide to the public
“final safety determinations” and “safety ratings”
as mandated by 49 U.S. Code § 31144.
Congress has failed to properly recognize the
magnitude of this failure and require
accountability from FMCSA. Within this
context, the courts have failed by requiring of
brokers and third-party logistics companies a
responsibility that could not be fulfilled, no
matter how long they might look as SMS
BASICs data. It is time for the Congress,
FMCSA and the courts to realize the nature and
significance of this folly, and restore to brokers
and third-party logistics companies, who are
least culpable, a standard of care that is realistic
and takes into consideration the magnitude of
what has been wrought from the confusion on
this issue.
Congress must ask the FMCSA for answers to
the following: Can they provide to the public
final determinations of safety on all registered
carriers? If not. how do they intend to comply
with their statutory duty to do so? In asking
these question and listening to FMCSA’s
response, Congress should not be distracted by
FMCSA’s rhetoric about “intervention”...it is
not the same as providing safety ratings. If
developmental data such as BASICs is a worthy
element of ultimately getting to the ability to
provide safety ratings, then let it be recognized
as such and not as a rationalization for their
failure to perform their primary duty. It follows
that brokers should not be assigned this duty
with the intractable information now admitted by
FMCSA to be less than reliable for such a
purpose.43

The courts who in the future consider the duty of
brokers to use reasonable care in the selection of
carriers should do so with recognition of the
errors of the past. Such judicial reformation
might start with a more careful analysis of the
real role of brokers in the facilitation of
providing carriers for loads and loads for
carriers. It must also take into consideration that
some of the prior decisions that have imposed
impossible standards upon brokers have perhaps
been motivated by subjective reasoning. Courts
w ho reconsider the duty of brokers, in light of
the mistakes of the Schramm decision, might
consider the reasoning of Judge Smith of the
Georgia Court of Appeals,
...we arc troubled by the result in
this case... We cannot, however,
allow our sympathy for the plight of
those injured by commercial trucks
to lead us toward imposing strict
liability on a party that does not
possess the requisite degree of
control over another's conduct.
Resolution of this public policy issue
lies with the legislative branch of our
government, not with the judiciary.44
In the interim the courts can return to a more
sensible notion that carrier safety is administered
by FMCSA, and FMCSA has a statutory duty to
provide a final safety determination and safety
rating. Brokers and other third parties cannot
fairly be charged with this duty. It is reasonable
to suggest that this was the recognition of all
courts who considered this issue for the fifty
years preceding the Schramm decision.
* Readers should note that the formatting in this
article is reserved for Law' Review style articles.
Regular research oriented articles should be
formatted in conformance with the Journal’s
Submission Guidelines.

43 See Note 24
44 Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 666 ,E.2d 567, (Ga. App., 2008)
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ABSTRACT
In 2011, McGinnis, Kohn, and Kara reported the effects of overall logisties strategy (OLS) on
logistics coordination effectiveness, customer service effectiveness, and organizational competitive
responsiveness. This manuscript empirically compares the three dimensions of the Bowersox
Daugherty typology to logisties strategies among U.S., Turkish, and Guatemalan companies. US,
Turkish, and Guatemalan subjects (logistics managers) were chosen to test the underlying factor
structure and measurement equivalences of the scales used. Using confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA), findings indicate that the three dimensions of the Overall Logistics Strategy (OLS) - Process
Strategy, Market Strategy, and Information Strategy - hold in all three country environments studied.
However, structural equation modeling shows nonequivalent relationships between OLS and
independent variables; logistics coordination effectiveness, customer service commitment, and
organizational competitiveness for one of the three countries. We evaluate these findings in light of
recent research into logistics strategy research on U.S. firms. Insights for those interested in
comparative logistics strategies are provided.
INTRODUCTION
For over twenty years, a substantial amount of
empirical research has investigated the potential
of the Bo w'ersox/Daugherty (1987) typology and
validated it as a useful framework for studying
logistics strategy in the United State and Canada.
In comparison to cross-cultural research in other
disciplines, such as management and marketing,
a review published by Luo, Van Hoek, and Ross
(2001) suggests that cross-cultural logistics is at
best in its infancy stage. Considering the speed
of globalization, a firm’s ability to manage
logistics in cross-country environments could
become an important success factor. Although,
globalization offers significant opportunities for

many MNCs to shift their manufacturing and
distribution around the world, and especially
towards developing and emerging markets,
global manufacturing strategies may not be
effective if not supported by successful logisties
strategies. Therefore, we strongly believe that
cross-cultural logistics studies have significant
potential to enrich our understanding of logistics
systems and strategies applicable in different
national environments. Such studies provide
critical logisties knowledge which could have
important international logistics management
implications.
A recent study by McGinnis, Kohn. and Kara
(2011) reported the role of overall logistics
strategy (OLS) on logisties coordination
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effectiveness, customer service effectiveness,
and organizational competitive responsiveness.
Using multi-year data collected in the US, their
findings showed that overall logistic strategy as
conceptualized by the Bowersox/Daugherty
dimensions, had significant effect on firm
competitiveness through the links of logistics
coordination and customer serv ice. However,
even though the best way to measure overall
logistic strategy (OLS) may be important to
researchers and practitioners, whether or not the
OLS should be assumed to be universal, is even
a more important empirical question that
deserves research attention. Therefore, our
interest in this study is to explore whether the
Bowersox/Daugherty typology is a useful
instrument for examining logistics strategies in
countries of different sizes, cultures, and
economic systems.
The authors postulate that a multi-country study
of U.S., Turkey, and Guatemala would furnish an
intriguing study of how logistics systems are
assessed in three nations through the lens of one
common measurement instrument. Furthermore,
such a study would provide a strong validation
of the dimensionality and structural relations
identified in the recent McGinnis, Kohn, and
Kara (2011) study. We emphasize that the
differences in each country’s geographic size,
population size, labor force make-up,
infrastructure, and economic system provides an
excellent platform for evaluating the validity of
the research instrument, as well as providing
insights into logistics strategies and outcomes in
three heterogeneous countries.
This current research adopts the perspective that
the Bowersox and Daugherty typology provides
a strong conceptual basis consistent across
countries with regards to salient dimensions of
logistics strategy. These dimensions should be
coordinated at many levels of the organization to
achieve competitive responsiveness regardless of
the country environment. Through this research
we hope to uncover the applicability of logistics
management strategy and understand the role
logistics management strategy plays in
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maintaining and enhancing competitive
advantage responsiveness in cross-country
environments. Using a confirmatory factor
analysis and a structural model, we assess the
validity of three dimensions of Bowersox and
Daugherty typology and their simultaneous
relationship to logistics coordination, customer
sendee effectiveness, and overall organizational
competitive responsiveness in three different
countries. The model adapted from McGinnis,
Kohn, and Kara (2011) uses a second-order
factor, called overall logistics strategy, to
represent the three dimensions of the Bowersox
and Daugherty typology and ultimately assesses
its impact on firm competitiveness.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Managers are required to know the strategies
that are used to sell their product lines, operate
their business model and address the demand
variables that arc operating in their environments
(Wanke and Zinn, 2004). Studying the
approaches to a firm’s decision-making process
and typologies can assist managers with future
decision challenges. While researchers have
found ample data among large firms to confirm
and support the Bowersox and Daugherty (1987)
logistics management decision making typology
(Clinton and Closs, 1997; McGinnis and Kohn,
1990, 1993, 1997 and 2002) there has been no
substantive research focusing on the relevance
the of Bowcrsox/Daughtery typology in different
country environments. As such, there is a gap in
the literature relating this typology and its
applicability to different cultural environments
of the developing and emerging markets.

Bowersox/Daugherty Typology and
Research Variables
Bowersox and Daugherty (1987) completed a
comprehensive study of logistics integration in
1987. In this research they identified three
distinctly different logistics management
strategy types that firms have used in their
decision-making. These decision types are

process strategy, market strategy, and
information strategy.
The three components that comprise the
Bowersox/Daugherty typology were tested by
McGinnis and Kohn (1993, 1997 and 2002). In
these studies McGinnis and Kohn sampled
subjects from large U.S. manufacturing firms.
This empirical research found that process and
market strategies were emphasized when
logistics strategies were intense. It was also
found that both strategies w'ere present at
moderate levels when firms used a balanced
strategy approach, and that both strategies were
present at low levels when firms used an
unfocused strategy. All of their studies
combined, indicated that the three dimensions
(logistics process strategy, market strategy and
information strategy) are important and have an
effect on firm’s successful management
activities. They did, however, find that it is more
likely that the three dimensions of the logistics
strategy will be combined rather than used
separately as Bowersox and Daughtery (1987)
originally indicated.
In 1997 Clinton and Closs completed a major
study testing the Bowersox and Daughterty
typology. They sampled 818 U.S. and Canadian
firms. The results of their study indicated that
there was a clear overlap among the three
strategies (information, market and process).
They concluded that this is to be expected
because logistics has to perform the same
activities regardless of the overall logistics
strategy. As such, with the typology
demonstrating its importance in logistics
management, it seemed only appropriate that
more investigation should be done focusing on
small firms since these business types constitute
the largest employer of human resources and rely
on logistics heavily to accomplish their goals.
The research reported in this manuscript
examined a sample of small firms to ascertain
whether process, market, and information
strategies can effectively describe logistics
strategy in this wider context, and especially in
the international environment.

The independent variables used in the research
reported in this paper are based on the
Bowersox/Daugherty (1987) typology discussed
earlier and are summarized as follows:
• Process Strategy: Management of
traditional logistics activities with a
primary goal of controlling costs,
• Market Strategy: Management of
selected traditional logistics activities
across business units with the goal of
reducing complexity faced by customers,
and
• Information Strategy: A diverse group of
traditional - and other activities managed as a system with the goal of
achieving inter-organizational
coordination and collaboration through
the channel.
The dependent variables used in this research
were:
• Logistics Coordination Effectiveness:
The extent that the organization
coordinates logistics activities internally,
as part of its overall strategic planning,
and though-out its supply chain
(customers, suppliers, and other channel
members).
• Customer Service Commitment: The
extent that customer services is
emphasized through employee training,
coordinated with other logistics
activities, and used as a source of
competitive edge.
• Company/Division Competitiveness:
The extent that the organization quickly
and effectively responds to, relative to
competitors, supply chain (suppliers and
customers) needs, competitor strategies,
develops new products; and is considered
a strong, moderate, or weak competitor
in most of its markets.
All six variables are represented by scales that
have been replicated, appear to fit the construct
name, and have relevant levels of reliability, and
are discussed in detail by McGinnis, Kohn, and
Spillan (2010).
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Recently, Chen et al. (2009) addressed the role
of integration across the supply chain and its
effectiveness on firm performance. Utilizing the
process approach in supply chain, they argued
that effective integration can be achieved
through processes across the supply chain. While
the importance of logistics strategy and process
integration has been emphasized in previous
studies, empirical analysis on the effect of
logistics strategy and logistics integration is
surprisingly rare. We attempt to address this gap
in the literature by decomposing logistics
integration into two components: logistics
process integration (Chen et al, 2009) and
logistics information integration. Logistics
process integration is defined as “a set of
continuous restructuring activities aimed at
seamlessly linking relevant business processes
and reducing redundant or unnecessary
processes within and across firms. We define

logistics information integration as the set of
practices (such as electronic data interchange or
integrated computer systems) associated with
designing and development of information
systems across firms.
Country Profiles
As shown in Table 1, the United Sates is much
larger in area than both other countries
(9,161,666 sq km/3,794,083 sq mi), with a
varied climate, has a population of
approximately 307.2 million, is 82% urban, a
GDP of US$ 14,800 billion, 226,427 km/
140,699 mi of railroads, and 4,209,835 km/
2,615,942 mi of paved roads.
According to findings presented by Hofstede
(2001), and shown as Table 2, the United States
culture is moderate on Power Distance, lowmoderate on Uncertainty Avoidance, high on
Individualism, and high on masculinity.

TABLE 1
SELECTED COMPARISONS OF
THE UNITED STATES, GUATEMALA, AND TURKEY
Category

United States

Guatemala

Turkey

Area (sq km/sq miles)*

9,826,675/3,807,983

108,889/42,042
(Slightly smaller
than Tennessee)

783,562/302,533
(Slightly larger than Texas)

Population*

307,212.123 est.

13,276,517 est.

78,785548 est.

Percentage of Population Urban*

82%

49%

70%

Make up of Labor Force*

Agriculture: 1.2%
Agriculture: 50%
Agricultural: 29.5%

Industry: 21.9%
Industry: 15%
Industry: 24.7%

Services: 76.9%
Services: 35%
Services: 45.8%

Gross Domestic Product*

SI4.26 trillion est.

S69.21 billion est.

S960.5 billion est.

Climate*

Varied

Tropical

Temperate

Railroads (km/miles)*

226,427/140.699

332/206

8,699/5398

Paved Roads (km/miles)*

4,209,835/261,594

4,893/3,040

313,151/194,559

2008 Public-sector

7.1: 22 of 178
countries.

3.2: 91 of 178
countries.

4.4: 56 of 178
countries.

Corruption Index.

*Source: United States Central Intelligence Agency WorldFactbook (www.cia.gov)
**Source: Transparency International (www.transparency.org). Index scores range between 9-10 = Very Clean to 0-.9 =
Highly Corrupt.
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Guatemala provides an excellent example of a
country that contrasts with the United States.
According to the United States Central
Intelligence Agency World Factbook
(www.cia.gov, 2010), Guatemala is slightly
smaller than Tennessee (108,889 sq km/42,042
sq mi), tropical, has an estimated population of
14,361,666, is 49% urban, a GDP of $69 billion,
332 km/200 mi of railroads, and 4,863 km/2,872
mi of paved roads. Culturally, Guatemala is
relatively high on Power Distance, Uncertainty
Avoidance, low on Individualism, and moderate
on Masculinity.
As result of having the highest birth rate in
Western Europe, Turkey has a very young
population. It has significantly skilled and
competitive labor, a massive domestic market, a
unique geographical location, and a forceful
private sector with close regional connections.
The 2009 Census of Turkey counts its
population at 72.5 million, with a growth rate of
1.45 percent per annum. Two-thirds (67 percent)

of the population are in the group of those 15- to
64-years-old. (Turkish Statistical Institute,
2010). Turkey is slightly larger than Texas
(783,562 sq km /302,533 sq mi). Turkey is also
one of the countries in the world with a fast
urbanization rate, at an average yearly annual
rate of 1.9 percent between 2005 and 2010
(McGinley, 2009). There is a great movement
into the cities from rural areas, which is
producing the urban population to rapidly
increase. Turkey has now reached almost one
trillion dollars of GDP, and has 8,699 km/5398
mi of railroads, and 313,151 km/ 194,559 mi of
paved roads. Turkey’s culture is summarized as
high on Power Distance, medium-high on
Uncertainty Avoidance, moderate in
Individualism, and moderate on Masculinity.
A careful review of the information presented in
Tables 1 and 2 reveals three disparate
environments for examining logistics strategy.
The United States could be summarized as
geographically large, with a population

TABLE 2
A COMPARISON OF AMERICAN, GUATEMALAN, AND TURKISH WORK PLACE
CULTURES
Dimension Index/ Interpretation

United States

Guatemala

Turkey

Power Distance

40/38
(Moderate)

95/2-3
(High)

66/18-19
(High)

Uncertainty Avoidance

46/43
(Low-moderate)

101/3
(High)

85/16-17
(Medium-high)

Individualism/ Collectivism

91/1
(High)

6/53
(Low)

37/28
(Moderate)

Masculinity/ Femininity

62/15
(High)

37/43
(Moderate)

45/32-33
(Moderate)

Long-Term/ Short-Term Orientation

29/27
(Short-tenn oriented)

NA

NA

Source: Adapted from: Geert Hofstede (2001), Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and
Organizations Across Nations, 2nd Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage Publications. Appendix 5.
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employed predominately in services, an average
Gross Domestic Product of approximately
$45,000 per capita, with a varied climate, and
extensive transportation infrastructure
appropriate for the country’s size, and a
moderately low level of public sector corruption.
The United States culture is relatively
egalitarian, more likely to be risk taking,
individualistic, and results oriented.
Guatemala is small geographically, with a
population employed predominately in
agriculture, an average Gross Domestic Product
of approximately $5,200 per capita, with a
tropical climate, a modest transportation
infrastructure, and an above average level of
public sector corruption. Its culture is relatively
hierarchical, more likely to avoid risk,
eollectivistic, and more likely to balance
relationships and results. Turkey is
geographically moderate in size with a
population predominately working in industry
and services, an average Gross Domestic
Product per capita of approximately $12,000, a
temperate climate, a well-developed
transportation infrastructure, and an average
level of public sector corruption. Turkey’s
culture is relatively hierarchical, between the
United States and Guatemala on Risk Avoidance
and on Individualism/Collectivism, and balanced
on relationships and results.
As seen from Tables 1 and 2, as well as the
summaries presented in the previous paragraphs,
the results of an assessment of orientations
toward logistics strategy in these three cultures
should not be taken as a foregone conclusion.
An ethnocentric perspective of a United States
practitioner or academic might be “logistics
strategy (and supply chain management) will be
the same, or differ little, regardless of the
economic/cultural situation.” However, a
polycentric perspective might argue that
“Logistics strategy (and supply chain
management) will be unique to each economic/
cultural situation, and logistics strategy will
differ according to the economic/cultural
characteristics of the situation.” Finally, a
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geocentric perspective might argue that “The
fundamentals of logistics strategy (and supply
chain management) are similar and will be
tailored to the needs of the economic/cultural
situation.”
STUDY METHODOLOGY
The following sections examine Measures, and
Data Collection.
Measures and Questionnaire Development
To conceptualize the factors of our research
model, we used scales adapted from McGinnis,
Kohn, and Spillan (2010) study. The
questionnaire was divided into three parts. In the
first part, the overall logistics strategy of the
companies were measured by three dimensions;
process strategy’, market strategy> and
information. Respondents were requested to
determine their level of agreement with three
statements for process, market and information
strategics for their company /division on a live
point -type scale (1 = definitely agree,
5=definitely disagree). In the second part of the
questionnaire questions were asked in order to
measure the relationships among logistics
strategy constructs that are hypothesized to
contribute logistics coordination effectiveness
measured by three statements. Similar Likert
scale measures (1 = definitely agree,
5=dcfinitely disagree) in the first section of the
questionnaire were used in the second section as
well. In the third part of the questionnaire, we
included statements to measure customer service
commitment and company division
competitiveness using the same Likert Scale as
previously used in the first and second part of
questionnaire.
Bilingual associates translated the designed
questionnaire into both Turkish and Spanish. To
ensure the quality of the translation, we used
back translations to check for any discrepancies
and translation errors in both countries. The
questionnaires were pre-tested with a small
group of participants in both Turkey and
Guatemala before the questionnaire’s
administration. In both countries the results

TABLE 3
INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES'
Average Cronbach Alphas

Scale items

Turkey

USA

Guatemala

.651

.524

.856

.741

.624

.894

.629

.739

.903

.609

.733

.818

.695

.634

.830

.733

.532

.907

Scale 1: Process Strategy (PROCSTR)

-b
3

1.1. In my company/division, management emphasizes achieving maximum
efficiency from purchasing, manufacturing, and distribution.
1.2. A primary objective of logistics in my company/division is to gain control
over activities that result in purchasing, manufacturing, and distribution costs.
1.3. In my company/division, logistics facilitates the implementation of cost
and inventory reducing concepts such as Focused Manufacturing and
Just-in-Time Materials Procurement
Scale 2: Market Strategy (MKTGSTR)

Z
-u

Z
UJ

z

2.1. In my company/division, management emphasizes achieving coordinated
physical distribution to customers served by several business units.
2.2. A primary objective of logistics in my company/division is to reduce the
complexity our customers face in doing business with us.
2.3. In my company/division, logistics facilitates the coordination of several
business units in order to provide competitive customer service.
Scale 3: Information Strategy (INFOSTR)

3.1. In my company/division, management emphasizes coordination and
control of channel members (distributors, wholesalers, dealers, retailers) activities.
3.2. A primary objective of logistics in my company/division is to manage
information flows and inventory levels throughout the channel of distribution.
3.3. In my company/division, logistics facilitates the management of information
flows among channel members (distributors, wholesalers, dealers, retailers).
l ogistics Coordination Effectiveness (LCE)

*
C/D
UJ
3

4.1. The need for closer coordination with suppliers, vendors, and other
channel members has fostered better working relationships among departments
within my company.
4.2. In my company logistics planning is well coordinated with the overall
strategic planning process.
4.3. In my company/division logistics activities are coordinated effectively
with customers, suppliers, and other channel members.
Customer Service Coordination (CSC)

>

z
z

5.1. Achieving increased levels of customer service has resulted in increased
emphasis on employee development and training.
5.2. The customer service program in my company/division is effectively
coordinated with other logistics activities.
5.3. The customer service program in my company/division gives us a
competitive edge relative to our competition.
Company/Division Competitive Responsiveness (COMP)

6.1. My company/division responds quickly and effectively to changing
customer or supplier needs compared to our competitors.
6.2. My company/division responds quickly and effectively to changing
competitor strategies compared to our competitors.
6.3. My company/division develops and markets new products quickly
and effectively compared to our competitors.
6.4. In most of its markets my company/division is a very strong competitor.

*Scales: 1 = Strongly Agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4 = Disagree, 5 = Strongly Disagree.
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were satisfactory with respect to the
meaningfulness and the applicability of the
questions in those country environments.
The three independent and three dependent
variables used in this research are presented in
Table 3. Included in Table 3 are the items for
each variable, and the scale reliabilities in each
of the three countries (United States, Guatemala,
and Turkey). Previous research (Kohn and
McGinnis, 1997b) has concluded that the six
variables are valid when studying logistics
strategy using logistics managers in
manufacturing firms for subjects.
Data Collection
Data for the research was collected using the
developed questionnaire containing the above
explained measures. The data for the U.S. was
collected in manufacturing firms who were
members of the Council of Supply Chain
Management Professionals (CSCMP).
Respondents from manufacturing companies
were titled managers or higher in logistics,
distribution, or supply chain management and
were sampled via mail questionnaires with a pre
notification letter, the questionnaire with a cover
letter, and a follow-up letter.
Data for Turkey was collected using a selfadministered questionnaire that was distributed
to 500 SMEs (Small-Medium enterprises)
operating in the manufacturing sector within the
city of Istanbul. This sample was selected
randomly from the database of the Turkish Small
Business Administration (KOSGEB). As of
2008, the KOSGEB database included a total of
12,270 SMEs in Istanbul. This accounts for
nearly 28% of all SMEs registered throughout
Turkey.
Requests were made for the survey to be done by
a senior officer/executive in charge of logistics,
distribution and supply chain management. The
responses indicated that a majority of the
respondents completing the questionnaire were
in fact high level members of logistics
departments. Of the 500 surveys posted, a total
of 232 questionnaires were returned after one
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follow-up. 18 questionnaires were excluded due
to missing values. The overall response rate was
43% (216/500), which was judged acceptable for
subsequent analysis. An evaluation of the yearly
sales volume, number of employees and sub
industry variation showed no significant
differences between the responding and non
responding managers. Thus, the surveys
satisfactorily characterized the total sample
group of manufacturers.
In Guatemala researchers worked through the
Ministry of Economics as a means of collecting
data. Ministry of Economics statf was trained
by the researchers on what the survey contents
were, how to complete the survey and how to
respond to questions from the respondents. In
order to collect data The Ministry of Economies
staff conducted face-to-face interviews with
logistics, distribution and supply chain managers
from midsize and large companies located in
nine major regional centers in Guatemala. From
these interviews staff were able to collect a total
of one hundred and eighty (180) completed,
usable surveys. The selected firms came from a
large geographic area, with interviews taking
place in several different areas including
Guatemala City, Escuintla, Villa Nueva,
Quetzaltenango, Coban, Salama, Chiquimula,
Sacatepequez and Peten. A total of 174
questionnaires were retrieved, but, only 156
usable questionnaires were attained due to
incompleteness and other survey operations
problems.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The first step was to check the construct
reliabilities for all three countries. Table 3
discussed earlier also shows comparative
average construct reliabilities. Although some of
the reliability scores were below the suggested
levels in the literature, in general we can make a
case that these scores are satisfactory for testing
and validating the structure reported in
McGinnis, Kohn, and Kara (2011). In addition,
as coefficient values are relatively receptive to
the number of items in the constructs,
particularly when constructs have fewer than ten

items (as in the case of the research model), it is
common to find quite low coefficient alpha
around 0.50 (Pallant, 2007).
With the intention of evaluate whether the
correlations among variables are suitable for
factor analysis, we examined the Kaiser-McyerOlkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMOMSA) (Kaiser, 1970). Table 4 shows the results
for KMO tests for sampling adequacy and
Bartlett’s test for sphericity for the 3 data sets of
the US, Guatemala, and Turkey as well as the
mean scores for the constructs in all three
countries. The value of KMO-MSA was 0.832
for the US sample, .900 for Guatemalan sample
and 0.663 for the Turkish sample indicating the
data were appropriate for factor analysis. All

KMO results were above .50 which is the
minimum cut off for factor analysis.
Additionally all levels of significance for
Bartlett’s test for sphericity were less than .005.
KMO results along with the Bartlett results
indicate the data is suitable for factor analysis.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
To confirm the underlying factor structure, the
authors conducted CFA on all datasets using
AMOS. We assessed the goodness of the fit of
the models using various fit indices testified to
in previous studies, including the + 2 statistic,
normed fit index (NFI), non-normed fit index,
(NNF1), comparative fit index (CFI) goodness of
fit index (GFI); Standardized Root Mean, Square
Residual (SRMR); and Root Mean Square Error

TABLE 4
AVERAGE VALUES OF INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES:
USA, GUATEMALAN, AND TURKISH MANUFACTURING FIRMS
USA Data Average

Guatemala Data

Turkish Data

1990-2008*

Average, 2010

Average, 2010

1. PROCSTR**

2.332

2.245

2.071

2. MKTGSTR**

2.541

2.057

2.394

3. INFOSTR***

2.769

2.107

2.398

1. LCE**

2.580

2.098

2.056

2 CSC**

2.5205

2.166

2.461

3. COMP**

2.3969

2.1090

2.6157

KMO Measure of

0.832

0.900

0.663

0.000

0.000

0.000

Variables

Independent Variables

Dependent V ariables

Sampling Adequacy

Bartlett’s Test
of Sphericity

'Adapted from Adapted from: McGinnis, Michael A., Jonathan W. Kohn, and John E. Spillan (2010), “A Longitudinal
Study of Logistics Strategy: 1990-2008,” Journal of Business Logistics, Vol. 31, No. 1. pp. 217-235. **Scales: 1 =
Strongly Agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4 = Disagree, 5 = Strongly Disagree. *** Significant
differences among three countries
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of Approximation (RMSEA). The two-step
approach suggested by Anderson and Gerbing
(1988) was used to first examine the
measurement model and then the structural
model. In the measurement model, the
relationship between the nine logistics strategic
orientations and the three first order factors were
examined to understand how well the
relationships fit the data. In the structural model,
we examined the relationship between the three
first order factors (PROCSTR, MKTGSTR, and
INFSTR). The findings supported the underlying
factor structure of the 19 items with correlated
factors.
The results of the estimation of the first order
factor model revealed very strong results for all
datasets used as indicated by several different
measures (1). As suggested by McGinnis, Kohn,
and Kara (2011), we allowed two of the error
terms to be correlated. The figures of GFI and
CFI, were all larger than or equal for all three
countries (2).
The normalized chi-square (chi-square/degrees
of freedom) of the CFA model was smaller than
the recommended value of 3.0, the RMR was
smaller than 0.05, and the RMSEA were smaller

(X“ lisa- 31.058. X' Guatemala —48.65, and X'

than or very close to 0.08 (3). Although the X:
value for two of the datasets were significant,
due to the sensitivity of this measure, it was not
considered a major concern since the other fit
indices showed strong model fit. Accordingly,
the results in Figure 1 showed that all loadings
in the model were significant, leading us to
conclude that the relationships between the
items and latent factors were confirmed by the
three datasets obtained from different countries.
The last step in the process to confirm the
underlying structure of the model was to
evaluate the relationship between the three first
order factors and a second order factor named
“overall logistics strategy.” The purpose here is
to understand how the three factors contributed
to an overall construct. The results of the second
order confirmatory factor analyses for all three
datasets showed very good fit indices (4).
Structural Models
The structural model was used to test the
hypotheses of all six factors tested in the
measurement model. The hypothesized structural
models for three datasets are shown in Figure 2.
Inspection of Figure 2 revealed that the all
linkages were significant and the directions of

turkey-

38.40)

GFI usa^O-962; CFI usa-0-970; GIT Guatemala- 0.940; CFI guatem ala-0.941; GFI
xurkey^O.962; CFI turkey^0.988)

(RMSEA usa=0.049; RMSEA Guatemala^.082 and RMSEATUrkey=0.059)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(/2 USA- 31.058; GFI USA-0.962; CFI USA-0.970; RMSEA USA-0.049; y2 GUATEMALA
=27.89; GFI GUATEMALA-0.940; CFI GUATEMALA-0.941; RMSEA
GUATEMALA-0.082; %2 TURKEY- 36.37; GFI TURKEY-0.962; CFI TURKEY-0.988;
RMSEA TURKEY-0.059)
(4)
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FIGURE 1
FIRST ORDER CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF OVERALL LOGISTICS
STRATEGY
A.
LSA DATA
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FIGURE 1
B. GUATEMALA DATA
First Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Overall Logistics Strategy Guatemala Data
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FIGURE 1
C. TURKISH DATA
First Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Overall Logistics Strategy Turkish Data
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FIGURE 2
SEM FOR OVERALL LOGISTICS STRATEGY AND COMPETITIVENESS
A. USA DATA

Chisquare= 125.971, p-value=.022, GFI=. 916, CFI=. 960, RMSEA=. 043

FIGURE 2
B. GUATEMALA DATA

Chisquare=192.600, p-value=.000, GFI=.867, CFI= 910, RMSEA=.081
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FIGURE 2
C. TURKISH DATA

Chisquare= 170.718, p-value=.000, GFI=.912, CFI=.962, RMSEA=.061

relationships were as hypothesized for the US
and Guatemala datasets. Although the model fit
is considered acceptable, only one of the
hypothesized links for Turkish data was
significant. In other words, it seems like OLS
and LCE did not have any significant influence
on CSC. Only CSC had significant influence on
competitiveness of Turkish companies.
Overall, the US and Guatemala datasets
supported the hypothesized relationship
directions and strength of the hypothesized
relationships, while Turkish dataset did not
provide the expected support. While this may be
due to some other factors not examined in the
study, one could speculate that there might be
fundamental differences among these constructs
in the Turkish market environment. However,
the authors conclude that the agreement on the
consistency of direction of the relationships in
factor structures in all three datasets, and support
for hypothesized structural relationships in two
out of three datasets, provides encouragement

regarding the relationship of logistics strategy
and Organization Competitive Responsiveness
in international environments.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF
FINDINGS
The results of this study provide helpful insights
to logistics/supply chain management
practitioners regarding effective management of
logistics strategy and contributions to
organizational competitiveness. First, overall
logistics strategy (OLS) does not seem to differ
among disparate cultures. As discussed earlier,
the three components of OLS (process, market,
and information) appear to be consistent across
the three cultures examined. However,
agreement regarding the lack of significance
between OLS and logistics coordination
effectiveness (LCE), and the lack of significance
between LCE and customer service coordination
(CSC) in Turkey provides some pause regarding
the premise that logistics/supply chain strategy
necessarily leads to organizational
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competitiveness. In the Turkish data the lack of
significance between OLS and LCE do not
indicate a lack of significance between CSC and
organizational competitive responsiveness
(COMP). This indicates that customer services
contributes to organizational competitive
responsiveness regardless of whether there is a
close relationship between the overall logistics
strategy (OLS) and the commitment to customer
service (CSC). These findings suggest that, at
least in the Turkish data, that the goals of
customer service coordination may be achieved
across the organization, as suggested by Chen et
al., 2009, rather than as a result of a focus by
one component of overall strategy, such as OLS.
While an organizational focus on customer
service is the goal of logistics and supply chain
management, it may be possible that an
organization may be focused on customer
service independent of OLS. Stated another way,
an organization (or culture) with a commitment
to customer service may not require the logistics
strategy to facilitate that commitment. Further
research into logistics strategy in other cultures
may provide further insight into the strength of
logistics/supply management’s role in customer
service and organizational competitive
responsiveness.

organizational competiveness. At first glance,
one might question this finding and argue
against the validity of the structural model.
However, the Turkish economy is going through
a tremendous liberalization and is considered a
major emerging market. Therefore, it is the high
volatility market in terms of structural
realignments, and this may result in an emphasis
on customer service and competitive
responsiveness being integral to strategy as the
Turkish economy emerges into an already
competitive global economy. Second, because
many Turkish logistics activities arc still
performed using traditional inefficient systems,
an emphasis on customer service and
competitive responsive may be resulting in
logistics management in Turkish organizations
being bypassed by organizational priorities and
strategies. This might have led to a significant
variation among the participants in terms of their
understanding and expectations of logistics
strategy. Finally, it is possible that the current
structural model might not have captured the
effects of logistics strategy on overall
competitiveness due to the rapid changes taking
place in the economy, Turkish business
strategics, and lags in the role of logistics in
Turkey.

Our findings show that given the Bowersox/
Daugherty dimensions of logistics strategy arc
invariant across the cultures/countries studied
and that the measures of logistics strategy
assessed by three dimensions hold in all three
countries. These results suggest that the assumed
links between logistics strategy and
organizational competitiveness did not hold in
all cultures. In other words, even if overall
logistics strategy may be comprised of process,
market, and information dimensions, its impact
on overall organizational competiveness may
vary across the nations.

CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to explore
whether the Bowersox/Daugherty typology is a
useful instrument for examining logistics
strategies in countries of different sizes, cultures,
and economic systems. Wc mentioned at the
outset of this study that globalization has altered
the management activities and practices of many
world wide companies. With supply chain
management at the center of business activity, it
is imperative that managers find and use new
ideas that will help them become more
competitive in highly competitive markets.
Finding new insights into how they can manage
their manufacturing and supply chains is
essential for goal attainment, profitability and
sustainability.

In the case of the Turkish model, although not
significant, the relationships between the
constructs were in the hypothesized direction
with CSC showing the strongest effect on the
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Our findings indicate that there are some
similarities and some differences in how
managers conceive the issues of logistics and
how they process them and execute them in their
daily practice. This is not unusual nor is it a
negative out come. We would expect that in
different cultures managers would see some
processes, some strategics and information
exchanges differently. It is important to note that
the fact that there is consistency in direction and
relationship of constructs means that the
Bowersox/Daugherty typology is a useful
instrument for examining logistics strategies in
different countries and our confirmatory factor
analysis results validate the dimensionality of
the model. We tested previous hypotheses
regarding the effect of logistics strategy and
logistics practices on firm’s competitiveness in
the context of cross sectional business firms.
Therefore we can say that managers in different
countries and cultures have some of the same
ideas about the meaning of the logistics concepts
and how they need to be implemented. This is
very important to managers for a couple of
reasons: (a) when considering out sourcing or
expanding to a foreign land i.e. Guatemala or
Turkey, managers can have a better
understanding of how these countries will react
to the logistical strategy, process and information
issues that arc present in their companies and
countries, and (b) when exporting or importing
goods, companies can have more insight into the
relationships that are present in the three
concepts studied in this research. Our findings
suggest that logistics and supply chain
management appear to be geocentric, where, as
stated earlier, the fundamentals of logistics
strategy (and supply chain management), while
fundamentally similar, will be tailored to the
economic/cultural situation. While overall
logistics strategy may be a driving force for
competitive responsiveness in many cultures, it
appears that competitive responsiveness in some
cultures will originate elsewhere. To what
extent these statements holds will be the result
of further research into logistics strategy in
additional cultures.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
Future research into logistics/supply chain
management should seek opportunities to
explore practices in other countries/cultures.
Little is known of comparative logistics/supply
chain management in the various countries of
Asia and the subcontinent of India. Further,
logistics and supply chain management
practices, and their impact on customer service
and organizational competitive responsiveness
have not been systematically studied. Further
research into logistics and supply chain
management may benefit from expanding the
understanding of logistics/supply chain
management decision making by including
antecedents and moderating factors (such as
competition, market turbulence, and differences
in business environment) into the design.
In addition to further study of logistics/supply
chain management in other nations/cultures,
additional insight could be gained by examining
the relevance of the Bowersox/Daugherty
typology to nonmanufacturing industries
including retailing, healthcare, financial services,
transportation firms, and food service. These
industries may provide a different perspective on
the process, market, and information strategy in
different environments.
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LTL PRICING: LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE
C. Clifford Defee
Joe B. Hanna
Robert Overstreet
Auburn University
ABSTRACT
Numerous LTL carriers struggled during the recent recession as customers demanded lower prices.
This study is designed to qualitatively evaluate the data gathered from three industry segments
regarding LTL pricing. Researchers used semi-structured interviews to conduct an in-depth
investigation with over two dozen industry experts who represented shippers, carriers, and 3PLs.
Interview transcripts were analyzed using a grounded theory coding technique. Five major themes
emerged from the interview transcripts. These themes are used to describe possible future
adjustments to industry pricing structure.

INTRODUCTION
During the late 1970’s, legislators and regulators
began to reexamine the impact that regulation
was having on the motor carrier industry. Many
experts felt that the marketplace of the 1970’s
was far different from the marketplace of the
1930’s which initially led to transportation
regulation. By the late 1970’s, policy and
industry experts asserted that regulation was no
longer necessary and that the costs of continued
regulation dramatically outweighed any benefits
that might be obtained from continuing to
regulate the motor carrier marketplace (Harper,
1982; Pickett and Kletke, 1984; Pustay, 1985).
Additionally, it was determined that some
operating inefficiencies and anti-competitive
pricing practices were taking place (Chow,
1980).
On July 1, 1980, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980
was enacted, exhibiting a shift in government
policy toward a free marketplace, effectively
ending forty-five years of federal regulation of
the industry. Deregulation altered the landscape
of the industry in many ways as carriers
attempted to adjust to the new operating
environment. One major challenge carriers
faced was the pricing of their services. In a
regulated environment, individual carriers were
not responsible for establishing prices for
specific services. Along with deregulation came
the freedom and responsibility for carriers to

establish their own price for a specific service.
Pricing in a free market environment was critical
to carrier survival, but it was also uncharted
territory.
U.S. motor carriers traditionally referred to the
National Motor Freight Classification (NMFC)
system as the basis for classifying freight. This
classification system, along with an extensive
tariff system developed during the regulated era,
were still being used as guides after deregulation
to help carriers establish transportation rates.
Over time, the "base rates” reflected in the
legacy pricing systems began to portray a less
accurate depiction of motor carrier pricing
reality. As a result, carriers began to discount
the base rates of the old system to more
accurately reflect the actual price of a carrier’s
services.
Now more than 30 years removed from
deregulation many feel the base rates, while still
being used extensively by the U.S. motor carrier
industry, have become almost meaningless.
Experts point to the common practice of deeply
discounting base rates as a primary indication of
the gross inaccuracy of the base rates currently
being used to price motor carrier transportation
services. Many of these same individuals have
also called for a complete motor carrier pricing
system overhaul.
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We examine the current state of LTL pricing and
draw conclusions on future directions based on a
series of expert interviews and a qualitative data
analysis. The paper is structured as follows.
First, relevant transportation pricing literature is
reviewed. Second, we describe the methodology
utilized in this research. Next, key findings are
summarized and major themes emerging from
the analysis are highlighted. We then comment
on the future of LTL pricing and suggest options
available to those pushing for change in industry
pricing structure.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Despite the critical role of transportation, the
pricing of transportation services has received
little attention (Topaloglu and Powell, 2007;
Toptal and Bingol, 2011). Relatively few
articles have focused on the pricing of LTL
service (Ozkaya et al., 2010). Ying and Keeler
(1991) studied the effects of deregulation on
motor carrier freight rates and found competitive
pressures following deregulation had led to
increased productivity and reduced rates subject
to extensive discounting. Baker (1991) found
that routine discounting, sometimes as high as
85%, had made base rates meaningless and that
the only meaningful figure was the effective rate
(base rate less discounts). Smith (1993)
acknowledged the complexity of setting prices in
an industry where the base rate is constantly
changing and discounting is so important to a
firm's competitive advantage. Carter, Fcrrin,
and Carter (1995) found evidence that purchase
order anomalies were the result of LTL pricing
strategies focused exclusively on highly
competitive LTL shipments and that this tended
to lead to overpricing the less common truckload
shipments handled by the LTL carrier.
Richardson (1998) reported on the complexity of
the LTL pricing system and the call by many
industry leaders to move out of the quagmire of
regulated thinking. The need for a change to be
accepted across the board was highlighted by the
problem of shippers cherry picking rates.
Harrington (1998) provided shippers with a
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primer for understanding many of the factors of
a carrier’s rate structure and recommended that
shippers take those factors into account in order
to negotiate the best price for services. The
active process of negotiating LTL prices was
also described by other researchers (e.g., Vilain
and Wolfrom, 2000; Caplice and Sheffi, 2003;
Clair and Fox, 2004; L. D. Smith. Campbell, and
Mundy, 2007).
More recent LTL studies have tried to examine
potential alternate pricing methods. Lin, Lin,
and Young (2009) developed a mathematical
model to determine the optimal price for timedefinite LTL freight services in Taiwan using
data from one of the largest LTL carriers in
Taiwan. Ozkaya et al. (2010) used regressionbased methodology to estimate LTL rates based
on three months of data from 2005. Several
articles have offered analytical models to
describe motor carrier pricing (e.g., Figliozzi,
Mahmassani, and Jaillet, 2007; Topaloglu and
Powell, 2007; Zhou and Lee, 2009; Toptal and
Bingol, 2011).
This study follows up two, somewhat dated
research reports that previously examined LTL
motor carrier pricing practices. The first study
titled “Pricing for the Nineties: An Examination
of LTL Motor Carrier Pricing Practices and
Suggestions for Improvement by Shipper
Customers” was conducted in 1993 by the
University of Tennessee’s Center for Logistics
Research. A subsequent study examining LTL
motor carrier pricing was conducted in 2002 by
Norbridge, Incorporated; a management
consulting company headquartered in Deerfield,
Illinois. The current study is designed to provide
the industry with up to date insights into the
current state and future directions of LTL motor
carrier pricing.

METHODOLOGY
Qualitative methods are being used more
frequently in contemporary supply chain
management research (Mello and Flint, 2009).

Qualitative methods are quite useful when
gaining understanding of the phenomenon of
interest is a primary researeh goal, or the
phenomenon is relatively unstudied as is the
case with our investigation of LTL industry
pricing practices (Halldorsson and Aastrup,
2003; Suddaby, 2006). We combine semistructured interviewing and the constant
comparison process of grounded theory data
analysis, similar to the approach outlined by
Randall, Defee and Brady (2010).
Sample and Unit of Analysis
The sample was developed from three distinct
groupings of firms that participate in the LTL
pricing process: LTL carriers, shippers
(individual customers), and 3PLs (aggregators of
multiple customers under a single freight
contract). Approximately 30 companies were
contacted and 25 companies agreed to
participate. The sample provided good coverage
from each of the three groups. Participating
companies are listed in Table 1.
We used a judgmental sampling method
(Fetterman, 1989) by seeking out the individual
within each organization best equipped to
address the topic of LTL pricing. Individual
participants were identified within each
organization by requesting an interview with one
manager or executive responsible for making

decisions associated with LTL pricing. In carrier
organizations this was often a Vice President of
Marketing, Pricing, or Revenue Management. In
shipper and 3PL organizations the interviewee
was typically a Director of Transportation or
Procurement. In each case participants
demonstrated intimate and exacting knowledge
of LTL industry practices and specifically the
pricing/rating process.
A total of 25 interviews were completed with an
average duration of 28 minutes and a standard
deviation of 12 minutes. All interviews were
recorded and transcribed for later analysis. In
all, the single-spaced transcripts totaled
approximately 200 pages. The unit of analysis
for this study were the discrete statements
regarding LTL pricing (Sherif, Zmud, and
Browne, 2006).
Analytical Process
Each transcribed interview was initially
reviewed for quality prior to initiating qualitative
analysis. Grounded theorists argue that
sampling is complete when saturation of the
identified categories (i.e., the point of
diminishing returns) has taken place, which as
explained by Charmaz (2006), supersedes
sample size. Premkumar (2003) points out that
despite the cost and time involved, the
interactive aspect of telephone interviews makes

TABLE 1
PARTICIPATING COMPANIES BY GROUP
Carriers
AAA Cooper Transport
Averitt Express
Central Freight Lines
Estes Express
FedEx Services
New Penn Motor Express
Southeastern Freight Lines
UPS Freight

3PLs
Cerasis
CH Robinson
England Logistics
Menlo Worldwide Logistics
TransPlace
Unyson Logistics
USTC Live Logistics
YRC Logistics

Shippers
Central Steel and Wire
Deere & Company
Mettler-Toledo
PACCAR Manufacturing
Peerless Pump
Pep Boys
Saint-Gobain Abrasives
Toro Company
Wix Filtration
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them very effective in attaining reliable data. In
this case the final 1-2 interviews in each
category provided limited or no new information
suggesting saturation had been achieved (Cho
and Trent, 2006).
The constant comparison technique (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Charmaz, 2006)
was used to code, memo, categorize, and recode
the data. Coding is the method by which the
data are fractured, analyzed, and grouped into
categories and ultimately into themes (Scholten,
2009). MAXQDA, a commercially available
software program, was used to streamline and
organize analysis of the transcripts. This
software uses data management techniques such
as multi-color coding, memo creating, and code
segment retrieval (Humble, 2009). Counts
provided by the software represent the frequency
for each of the themes and sub-categories (Sheri f
et al., 2006).
The first one-third of transcripts were divided
among two of the researchers and each
researcher independently coded their portion of
the transcripts. Once this task was completed,
the research team met to review and discuss the
individual coding results. Common terminology
was agreed upon in cases where it was
discovered that slightly different codes had been
used to identify similar concepts. The research
team then completed coding the remaining
transcripts, frequently discussing new codes and
recoding as necessary.
Throughout this process, codes were assigned to
categories based on similarity of intent.
Ultimately these categories were assigned to
higher-level categories which represent the
major themes emerging from the interview data
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This category
assignment process was performed individually,
but routinely evaluated, adjusted, and confirmed
through frequent meetings among the research
team.
The trustworthiness of the research was assessed
using the technique described by Flint and
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colleagues (2002). Internal (e.g., confirmation
of results by multiple research team members)
and external (e.g., member checks conducted
with a sub-set of interviewees and non-sample
business professionals) constituents were
utilized to assess the dimensions of credibility,
transferability, dependability, confirmability,
integrity, and fit (see Table 2). The member
cheeking activity was conducted with three
carrier representatives, three executives of an
LTL industry rating agency, and through
feedback from two presentations of preliminary
results at two national LTL conferences. The
feedback provided was extremely helpful in
shaping the initial interpretive analysis and later
in validating our conclusions.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The interpretive analysis of interviews with
carriers, shippers, and 3PLs resulted in five
emergent themes. Each of these themes is
outlined in this section. As Table 3 shows the
themes developed cut across all industry
participants. The categories listed in the table
demonstrate a breadth of topics that coalesce to
form each theme. In some cases the categories
represent essentially opposite views (e.g., re
indexing is needed; re-indexing is not needed).
This demonstrates one of the inherent issues in
the industry summarized in the last theme although there is wide support that change in
needed, there is little agreement on the best
approach for achieving that change. We offer
testable propositions for each theme.
Theme 1: Base Rates Should be ReIndexed
A base rate is simply the standard rate offered
for a carrier to move a given shipment from an
origin to a destination. For example, the base
rate for a carrier to move a 750 lb. pallet of auto
parts from Macon, GA to Orlando, FL may be
$250. However, the rating basis used throughout
the LTL industry has very little relation to
current carrier operating costs and service
options available through existing networks.

TABLE 2
EVALUATION OF TRUSTWORTHINESS
Method used to address

Criteria

Credibility
Three research team members provided input

Extent to whieh the results appear to be
aeceptable representations of the data

during data analysis and interpretation

Transferability
Triangulation across methods found common

Extent to which the findings from one study in
one context will apply to other contexts

categories in content analysis and interviews

Dependability
Member checking confirmed category theme

Extent to which the findings are unique to time
and place; the stability or consistency of
explanations

development

Confirmability
Saturation achieved within each of the three
groups present in the sample

Extent to which interpretations are the result of
the participants and the phenomenon as opposed
to researcher biases

Integrity
Member checking confirmed category theme

Extent to which interpretations are influenced by
misinformation or evasions by participants

development

Fit
Member checking interviewees were not
provided an explanation of findings prior to
interview

Extent to which findings fit with substantive
area under investigation

Notes: Trustworthiness definitions adapted from Flint et al. (2002).
Most rates used today were actually developed
20-30 years ago or longer, oftentimes during the
regulated period, and have been only moderately
adjusted over the years. The rates arc frequently
discounted 80% or more to establish the actual
prices charged to shippers.
Concern that the rating basis is meaningless is
widespread as the bulk of comments tended to
support the need for re-indexing. Participant
comments from each of the groups demonstrate
this is a generally held belief.
•

“We know we 're going to have to
update [the base rates] shortly,
because it s getting out of whack ”
(Shipper).

•

“Is the base rate completely arbitrary’?
Yeah, it’s ridiculous ” (3PL).

•

“If the discounts are ridiculous,
they ’re only slightly less ridiculous
than the base rates they 're off of”
(Carrier).

This belief is not new to the industry. A study
from 20 years ago (Baker, 1991), identified
similar unease with the rating-pricing process.
Thus, not much has changed in the industry in
recent years. Although a number of participants
suggested the market is ready for the re-indexing
of base rates, many comments highlighted the
complexity of making such a change.
•

“I don't think the marketplace is ready.
I think it would take years to get there ’’
(3PL).
Fall/Winter 2011
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF THEME DEVELOPMENT
Theme

Category

Base rates should be re-indexed

Re-indexing is needed
Re-indexing is not needed
Re-indexing will be difficult to accomplish
The market is readv for re-indexinc
The market is not ready for re-indexing

Wide use of benchmark pricing

Freight rates are based on
classification rules

Density / cube-based pricing

Industry change leadership

Used for base rates
Industry standard
Compare across carriers
Used to set freight rates charged to customers
NMFC classification is entrenched
NMFC classification is complex confusing
NMFC classification is manipulated
NMFC classification is moving to FAK
FAK simplifies freight rating
FAK provides deeper discounts
Future direction (near term)
Will add cost for shippers
Will add cost for carriers
Carriers have already created this rate structure
Surprised requests have not occurred
Carriers should lead
Shippers should lead
“Neutral” party should lead (i.e., SMCT
Shippers and carriers in concert
Shippers are the barrier to change

•

"I think the carriers are definitely ready
for it. I don't think that the shippers are
[ready] " (3PL).

•

"It may he cost prohibitive given the
ROI of most motor carriers today and
how the industry is structured around
it” (Shipper).

•

"If the heavy discounting activity
disappeared, obviously we wouldn't be
able to negotiate better pricing”
(Shipper).
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Shipper
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

3 PL Carrier
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

The last comment points out a basic fear
shared by each of the groups. LTL service is
viewed as a commodity by both carriers and
shippers. Although service levels and
damage vary across carriers, shippers are
extremely price conscious in making the LTL
freight purchase decision. If re-indexing
were to occur on a piecemeal basis, many
individual carriers believe they may be seen
as not being price competitive, at least until
customers became educated on how their
revised rate-price structure compares to the
established structure. Alternatively, if re
indexing were to be rolled out
simultaneously by all carriers, the carriers

that perceive themselves as weaker believe
they would be at a disadvantage. Quite
simply the motivation to change base rates
has not been great enough to overcome the
perceived risk of making such a change.
The entrenched nature of the base rate-pricing
structure and lack of movement toward
establishing new base rates over the past 20
years suggests the industry is at an impasse on
this issue. The interview comments and our
review of other studies touching upon the topic
lead us to believe the industry will not find a
way to re-set base rates in the near future despite
the broadly held belief this is desirable.
Theme 2: Benchmark Pricing
The concept of benchmarking to help manage a
business by assessing your position relative to
others in the marketplace is relatively common.
Benchmark pricing tools - typically software
containing base rates for all origin-destination
combinations - are widely used by both buyers
and sellers attempting to enhance their
understanding of TTL motor carrier pricing
practices. Several commercially available
benchmarking tools are available to aid current
and prospective customers faced with assessing
LTL prices.
The use of benchmarking is valuable to many in
the LTL market because of the unique pricing
practices currently used in the industry. With
many different sources available to establish a
base LTL rate and many different discounts off
of the various base rates, it is extremely difficult
to accurately compare the actual price for a
particular origin to destination combination.
Use of a benchmarking process helps to
standardize the pricing process.
Shippers frequently request that new LTL
transportation bids be based off of a specified
tariff or commercially available LTL base rate
benchmark tool such as SMC3’s CzarLite. This
allows for some standardization of the pricing
process, ultimately enhancing the ability of the

shipper to effectively evaluate carrier responses
to their request for proposal (RFP).
• “Use of a benchmarking tool allows
for an ‘apples to apples ’ comparison
when we are evaluating different bids
from potential providers of LTL
transportation serxnces ” (Shipper).
• “Some shippers accept quotes based
on our internal tariff base rates while
others require quotes based on a
different rate base source like
CzarLite. We know our costs of
providing specific services so we can
quote based off of any base rate
requested ” (Carrier).
Many participants conceded that benchmarking
is a valuable tool, especially in an industry with
a unique pricing system. However, others
indicated they use caution when examining and
interpreting LTL pricing data obtained through a
benchmarking process due to potentially
significant limitations. For example, several
interviewees indicated that any current LTL
pricing benchmark must be viewed cautiously
due to the complexity of current LTL pricing
practices.
• “ There are a number of base rate
sources that can be used to help
benchmark LTL motor carrier prices.
Some of the benchmark sources can
vary’ substantially, creating ambiguity
in the results of the benchmarking
process ” (3PL).
• Benchmarking can be a valuable tool
when trying to establish LTL rates and
we use it regularly as part of our
pricing process. However, like any
other method, you have to be
cognizant that benchmarking has its
limitations ” (Shipper).
Benchmark pricing tools arc widely used and
generally understood by the three key groups of
market participants addressed in this study. The
majority of representatives from each of the
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three groups generally agreed that undertaking
some form of benchmarking provides a value to
their business and enhances the overall industry.
While all three groups indicated benchmarking
was a common practice, shippers and 3PLs
tended to use benchmark pricing practices
primarily for establishing standard base rates
and for comparison purposes. Alternatively,
carriers appear to be adaptable to quoting
services using a specific requested base rate but
they appear to use benchmark pricing primarily
to monitor industry pricing practices and
processes.
Theme 3: Classification Rules
Today’s LTL motor carrier pricing practices are
unique from many other industries as a result of
the practices established during the regulated
period. Prior to deregulation in 1980, LTL
motor carrier freight rates were determined by
use of a freight classification system such as the
NMFC. The NMFC system attempted to
identify relatively homogeneous types of freight
and group them into specific freight
classifications. Once freight was categorized
into the appropriate classification, an
appropriate base rate could be assigned to each
class of freight.
Once the industry was deregulated, companies
were free to exercise business judgment and
began to adjust the prices charged for their
services. While prices began to change, carriers
continued to use the NMFC system as the source
for commodity classification because it was so
deeply entrenched in the industry. Then, in
order to adjust prices in the new era of
competition, carriers began to issue discounts
off of the published base rates for the various
classifications of freight. As carriers expanded
their knowledge and understanding of the costs
of providing services, they continued to adjust
their prices by issuing deep discounts off of the
base rates. Over time, the base rates associated
with various commodity classifications became
less accurate and therefore less meaningful to
industry participants. Despite the erosion of its
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usefulness, use of the NMFC system remains a
key part of LTL motor carrier pricing to this day.
• “ Today the base rates that stem from
the NMFC s commodity classification
process are almost totally meaningless
because they do not accurately reflect
the price you will pay for LTL motor
carriage ” (Shipper).
• “Over time, the NMFC system s impact
on freight categorization has
contributed to an erosion in the
accuracy of base rates to the point
where the rates are no longer at all
reflective of the costs associated with
providing the transportation service ’’
(Carrier).
• “Today’s LTL pricing system is
unnecessarily confusing and overly
complex. Our NMFC based system is
not congruent with the density based
pricing systems used throughout most
of the rest of the world” (3 PL).
While deeply entrenched, the NMFC system is
not always extremely useful for determining LTL
motor carrier prices. Disagreements over
identifying the appropriate classification for a
particular type of freight are frequent while the
practice and severity of discounts off of rates
based on the NMFC freight categorization
system has continued to grow. As the NMFC
has become less reliable as a viable predictor of
commodity categories and, ultimately the costs
of transporting a particular type of freight or
servicing a particular origin-destination
combination, carriers have begun to look for
ways to simplify the pricing process. Many
carriers responded by starting to use a FreightAll-Kinds (FAK) rate which reduced or
eliminated the importance of classifying
different types of freight and reduced the need to
use the NMFC system.
• “Continued use of an antiquated and
outdated classification system
(NMFC) only serves to create

confusion in the marketplace. While
FAK rates have reduced the confusion
associated with freight classifications,
FAK’s are really just another way to
offer a discount off of the NMFC’s
largely meaningless rates ” (Carrier).
• “After 30 years in a deregulated
environment, we have adapted to the
continued use of the NMFC system
and have adapted by using deep
discounts off of base rates. The
system can be confusing and
burdensome to those not familiar with
the system, and many feel it is time for
change. ” (Shipper).
• “Because the NMFC is somewhat
complicated, most customers prefer to
pursue an FAK based rate. ” (3PL).
The NMFC system is an artifact from the
regulated era of motor carriers. While
deregulation occurred over 30 years ago, the
NMFC system remains in place and continues to
play a key role in LTL motor carrier freight
categorization and pricing. While significant
challenges exist with the use of this system for
LTL pricing, the NMFC is so deeply entrenched
in the industry that it is likely to continue to play
a significant role in LTL motor carrier
categorization and pricing processes for the
foreseeable future.
Theme 4: Density-based Pricing
Pricing freight on the basis of density, also called
cube-based pricing, develops from the idea that
the price for transportation services is
determined by the weight and space used by the
freight being shipped. Density-based pricing is
essentially the method major package carriers
like FedEx and UPS use to rate package
shipments in the U.S. and elsewhere. This form
of pricing is widely used with LTL freight
outside the U.S., such as in Canada, but has not
gained acceptance in the U.S.

Many of the shippers and 3PL study participants
believe future LTL pricing will move to a density
model. The timing of this transition is unclear
with most participants describing the shift to
density pricing taking place "in the future”,
although the majority of statements refereeing to
timeframe anticipate a change may occur in the
relatively near future (5 years or less). Although
customers believe density pricing is on the
horizon, carriers consistently downplayed the
option. Summing up the broadly-held attitude of
carriers, one carrier executive said, "Right now
the industry is not ready for cube-based pricing.”
Nonetheless, customer opinion reflects their
interest in this alternative pricing model.
• “Theres got to be a better way to
identify the freight and cube pricing is
to me a good way. It's a better way
than the NMFC pricing we currently
have to follow” (Shipper).
• “A density tariff definitely will be part
of what everybody uses here in the near
future ” (3PL).
• “It’s going to take a while, but / think
cube is going to take over” (Shipper).
• “Everything is moving to density-based
items. I know that there are several
carriers that already have densitybased tariffs waiting in the wings ”
(3PL).
Despite customer enthusiasm for a density-based
model, respondents pointed to many obstacles
that must be overcome before a density model
could be implemented. Chief among these
issues are concerns over the cost of
implementing and operating a density pricing
solution for both shippers and carriers. The cost
issue consists primarily of concern over the
additional time required to capture freight
dimensions on the dock and the cost of acquiring
the technology needed to determine load
proportions.
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• “ You 'd have to measure each piece of
freight ...you really don't have the time
in a cross-dock environment to stop
and measure each shipment” (Carrier).

pricing practices will require leadership. What
is less clear is who should lead the change
process.
•

“Carriers must lead the change
process since they are the entities
charging the price for their
services. ” Those who sell
transportation services are in the
best position to change the pricing
mechanisms and buyers will respond
accordingly ” (Shipper).

•

"It’s going to take some large
shippers to take that lead, because
from a carrier standpoint, we 're not
ready to lead that and put in the cost
of implementing something of that
nature until it’s being askedfor. ”
(Carrier).

•

“We are in the best position to
change the pricing process and will
need to drive any reengineering to
the current pricing process "
(Carrier).

•

“I think you could look at FedEx
Freight and UPS Freight as taking
the lead andfor a couple reasons.
One, they 've got deeper pockets than
anyone else does to invest in that
research, and then secondly, they
already have the knowledge of how
they price that through the small
package environment. ” (Carrier).

•

“An industry consortium made up of
all the major players and led by an
independent entity like a professional
organization would allow everyone
to design a system that would be
superior to the current system and
hopefully mutually beneficial to all of
the players ” (3 PL).

• “ The cost involved is significant to
change the way that [carriers]
operate, change the way that they rate,
and to change their internal
structures ” (3PL).
• “ The [pallet scanning] technology> is
expensive and it s still too slow for us
to maintain the operational service
levels we need” (Carrier).
Although all three groups raised cost eoneems,
many shippers may be in a position to
accommodate a shift to density driven pricing:
• ”We don it ship anything that we don ’/
measure and weigh. Nothing leaves
this facility without a weight and
dimensions ” (Shipper).
• “There s not going to he a cost for me
[to switch to a density-based rating
system]. We ’re doing that already ”
(Shipper).
Density pricing is generally understood by all
three groups and there appears to be support for
this method of pricing from many shippers and
3PLs at least. However, the industry does not
currently have an organization or a group
committed to leading the change effort. As
technology improves in the next few years, we
believe the cost of capturing dimensional data
will drop to a point where that particular barrier
will be greatly reduced.
Theme 5: Industry Change Leadership
Many agree that the current LTL pricing system
is confusing, inaccurate, outdated, antiquated,
and in need of revision or replacement. But
what do we change to and who leads the charge
to the pricing promised land? It is clear any
significant change to current LTL motor carrier
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While general agreement seems to exist that
some type of change to the current LTL pricing
system is necessary, no consensus was evident

regarding the leadership needed to push sueh a
sweeping initiative forward. Many participants
expressed an opinion on the leadership question,
and while no clear support for a specific leader
is found in the data, carriers as a group were the
most frequently mentioned. However, the
potential leader’s suggestions covered many
options.

CONCLUSION
The nature of pricing in the LTL industry is
unusual in that it hasn't evolved in any
meaningful way during the three decades since
deregulation occurred. The situation is highly
unusual given the problems most study
participants described with the current system,
the overwhelming support for change to a
different system, and the fact that studies from
more than 20 years ago reported a similar dislike
of the status quo at that time (e.g., Baker, 1991;
Ying and Keeler, 1991). Clearly the lack of
strong leadership needed to drive major change
forward is lacking in the industry.
Challenges to any change initiative exist for the
industry. Re-indexing, elimination of NMFC
codes and density-based pricing are each
alternatives that could be pursued independently
or in combination. We believe the density
option may present the best option for moving
forward as most countries outside the U.S.
already use some form of density pricing for LTL
transportation. Further, the package
transportation business is already based on a
density pricing structure worldwide and two of
the major players (FedEx and UPS) are based in
the U.S.
Why hasn't the industry moved beyond a pricing
model rooted in the regulated era? One reason is
fear of renewed government interv ention. Many
of the industry insiders we interviewed
expressed concern that any type of collaborative
industry consortium aimed at bringing
participants together to examine possible
alternatives to the current pricing mechanism
would be improperly perceived as collusion.

Given that the history of motor carriage has a
strong regulated component and carriers are now
enjoying the benefits of operating in a
deregulated environment, many industry insiders
are hesitant to do anything that would be
perceived as a violation of anti-trust laws or any
type of behavior considered to be anti
competitive in nature. Overcoming this fear
may have to wait on the retirement of this
generation of LTL leaders that retain memories
of the deregulation experience. Another risk
constraining the industry is concern that being an
early adopter of any new pricing strategy could
backfire. Many leaders see such a change as a
“bet the company” strategy, and as sueh, a risk
not worth taking.
We believe the industry will begin to move
toward a density-based pricing model by the end
of this decade. But, a change agent is needed to
lead the way. We anticipate this change agent
may emerge in one or a combination of the
following three forms.
• Government policy. A major pricing
revolution in the motor carrier
industry may require government
intervention. This would most likely
come in a couple of ways. First, it
could come in the form of a
government assurance and
accompanied by guidelines that an
industry collaboration dealing with
the pricing topic, if handled properly,
would not cause concerns about anti
competitive behavior. Government
involvement could also come in the
form of support and direction from an
already existing transportation
regulatory body since carriers
regularly have to deal with various
government entities focused on motor
carriers.
• Industry consortium. Many
interviewees we spoke with indicated
a desire to have an industry
consortium of some type lead the
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pricing revolution. Many felt that a
variety of industry constituent groups
(e.g., carriers, shippers, 3PLs and
others) should have input into the
evolutionary process for motor carrier
pricing. It was suggested by several
study participants that professional
organizations serving the motor
carrier and shipper industries could
play a vital role in developing and
managing a broad consortium of
industry participants from various
constituent groups.
• A powerful transportation firm.
Other participants indicated a large
organization perceived to be a leader
in the industry could drive pricing
change efforts. Several individuals
who indicated a large industry leader
must serve as a change agent felt it
would require new pricing behavior
from a large transportation provider
to alter the pricing landscape. The
general belief is that a large
transportation provider would have
the clout to change the pricing
mechanism for the industry and have
other industry participants follow.

interest. We believe the qualitative approach
used in this study has shed new light on the
under-explored topic of LTL pricing. All study
findings are preliminary, and certainly our
conclusions are tentative and require follow-up
using other methods and larger samples before
they should be generalized to any extent. We
hope the analysis offered, while perhaps not
immediately testable, can serve to drive further
research in this area and lead to research that re
visits these topics in a few years.

REFERENCES
Baker, J. (1991), “Emergent Pricing Structures in
LTL Transportation,” Journal of Business
Logistics, 2(1): 91-202.
Caplice, C., and Sheffi, Y. (2003), “Optimization
Based Procurements for Transportation
Services,” Journal of Business Logistics, 24(2):
109-128.
Carter, J. R., Ferrin, B. G, and Carter, C. R.
(1995), “On Extending Russell and Krajewski’s
Algorithm for Economic Purchase Order
Quantities,” Decision Sciences, 26(6): 819-829.
Charmaz, K. (2006), Constructing Grounded
Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative
Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications Ltd.

While ten years may appear to be a long time to
wait in a business context, the basics of LTL
pricing have not changed in the three decades
following deregulation. This is due in part to
fear of government intervention - although few
of the “old timers” that worked in the industry
when it was regulated remain, the industry has a
long memory and many of the participants
mentioned a concern that government action
could result if any changes were deemed to be
anti-competitive or monopolistic. Beyond the
fear of government involvement, we believe it
will still take several years to work out the
leadership challenge.

Chow, G. (1980), “Studies of Intrastate Trucking
Regulation—A Critique,” Transportation
Journal, 19(4): 23-32.

Qualitative research can provide deeper
understanding of a subject and establish a
direction for future investigations into an area of

Fetterman, D. (1989), “Walking in Rhythm:
Anthropological Concepts”. In Ethnography:
Step by step (2nd ed., pp. 16-30). Thousands
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

56

Journal of Transportation Management

Clio, J., and Trent, A. (2006), “Validity in
Qualitative Research Revisited.” Qualitative
Research, 6(3): 319.

Clair, L. A., and Fox, S. D. (2004), “Time to
Simplify Trucking Tariffs (Less than
Truckload),” Supply Chain Management Review
8(3): 36-42.

Figliozzi, M. A., Mahmassani, H. S., and Jaillct,
P. (2007), “Pricing in Dynamic Vehicle Routing
Problems,” Transportation Science, 41(3): 302318.

Mello, J., and Flint, D. J. (2009), “A Refined
View of Grounded Theory and Its Application to
Logistics Research,” Journal of Business
Logistics, 30( 1): 107-125.

Flint, D. J., Woodruff, R. B., and Gardial, S. F.
(2002), “Exploring the Phenomenon of
Customers' Desired Value Change in a Businessto-Business Context,” The Journal of Marketing,
66(4): 102-117.

Ozkaya, E., Keskinocak, P. L, Joseph, V. R., and
Weight, R. (2010), “Estimating and
Benchmarking Less-than-Truckload Market
Rates,” Transportation Research Part E:
Logistics and Transportation Review, 46(5):
667-682.

Glaser, B. G (1978), Theoretical Sensitivity:
Advances in the Methodology of Grounded
Theory’. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.
Glaser, B. G, and Strauss, A. L. (1967), The
Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago, IL:
Aldine Transaction.
Halldorsson, A., and Aastrup, J. (2003), “Quality
Criteria for Qualitative Inquiries in Logistics,”
European Journal of Operational Research,
144(2): 321-332.
Harper, D. V. (1982), “Consequences of Reform
of Federal Economic Regulation of the Motor
Trucking Industry,” Transportation Journal,
21(4): 35-58.
Harrington, L. H. (1998), “The ABC’s of Motor
Carrier Economics,” Transportation &
Distribution, 38(10): 73-79.
Humble, A. M. (2009), “Technique
Triangulation for Validation in Directed Content
Analysis,” International Journal of Qualitative
Methods, 8(3): 34-51.
Lin, C. C., Lin, D. Y., and Young, M. M. (2009),
“Price Planning for Time-Definite Less-thanTruckload Freight Services,” Transportation
Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation
Review, 45(4): 525-537.
Lincoln, Y. S., and Guba, E. G. (1985),
“Designing a Naturalistic Inquiry”. In
Naturalistic Inquiry (pp. 221-249). Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Pickett, G. M., and Kletke, M. G. (1984), “The
Motor Carrier Act of 1980: An Industry Profile
of Its Effects in the Southwestern United States,”
Journal of Business Logistics, 5(2): 48-63.
Premkumar, G (2003), “A Meta-Analysis of
Research on Information Technology
Implementation in Small Business,” Journal of
Organizational Computing and Electronic
Commerce, 13(2): 91-121.
Pustay, M. W. (1985), “Reform of Entry into
Motor Carrier Markets: Was the Motor Carrier
Act of 1980 Necessary?,” Transportation
Journal, 25( 1): 11 -24.
Randall, W. S.. Defee, C. C., and Brady, S. P.
(2010), “Value Propositions of the U.S. Trucking
Industry,” Transportation Journal, 49(3): 5-23.
Richardson, H. L. (1998), “Simplify! Simplify!
Simplify!,” Transportation & Distribution,
39(10): 111-117.
Scholten, P. (2009), "Daring Decisions and
Representative Municipal Democracy: An
Exploration Within the New River Management
in the Netherlands,” The Innovation Journal:
The Public Innovation Journal, 14( 1): 1-15.
Sherif, K., Zmud, R. W., and Browne, G. J.
(2006), “Managing Peer-to-Peer Conflicts in
Disruptive Information Technology Innovations:
The Case of Software Reuse,” Management
Information Systems Quarterly, 30(2): 8.

Fall/Winter 2011

57

Smith, D. G. (1993), “Transportation Pricing and
Profitability Planning an Application of PenBased Computing,” Journal of Marketing
Theory and Practice, 1(2): 12-21.
Smith, L. D., Campbell, J. F., and Mundy, R.
(2007), “Modeling Net Rates for Expedited
Freight Services,” Transportation Research Part
E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 43(2):
192-207.
Suddaby, R. (2006), “From the Editors: What
Grounded Theory Is Not,” The Academy of
Management Journal 49(4): 633-642.
Topaloglu, FI., and Powell, W. (2007),
“Incorporating Pricing Decisions into the
Stochastic Dynamic Fleet Management
Problem,” Transportation Science, 41(3): 281-301.

Vilain, P, and Wolfrom, P. (2000), “Value
Pricing and Freight Traffic: Issues and Industry
Constraints in Shifting from Peak to Off-Peak
Movements,” Transportation Research Record:
Journal of the Transportation Research Board,
1707: 64-72.
Ying, J. S., and Keeler, T. E. (1991), “Pricing in
a Deregulated Environment: The Motor Carrier
Experience,” The Rand Journal of Economics,
22(2): 264-273.
Zhou, W. H., and Lee, C. Y. (2009), “Pricing and
Competition in a Transportation Market with
Empty Equipment Repositioning,”
Transportation Research Part B:
Methodological, 43(6): 677-691.

Toptal, A., and Bingol, S. O. (2011),
“Transportation Pricing of a Truckload Carrier,”
European Journal of Operational Research,
214(3): 559-567.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
C. Clifford Defee (Ph.D., University of Tennessee) is Assistant Professor of Supply Chain
Management and College of Business Advisory Council Research Fellow at Auburn University.
Cliff’s research interests include supply chain leadership, supply chain structure and performance,
and exploration of transportation industry trends. He is co-author of Auburn’s annual State of the
Retail Supply Chain report. His work has appeared in Journal of Business Logistics, International
Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, International Journal of Logistics
Management and Journal of Transportation Management. E-Mail: czdOOO 1 @aubum.edu
Joe B. Hanna (Ph.D., University of New Mexico) currently serves as Associate Dean and Regions
Bank Professor of Supply Chain Management in the College of Business at Auburn University. Dr.
Hanna has authored or co-authored numerous journal articles and a logistics textbook and has
participated in government funded transportation research. Joe is also an active member of several
professional organizations and regularly conducts professional training seminars. Prior to entering
academia, Joe gained professional experience working for Phillips Petroleum (now ConocoPhillips),
Phillips 66 Chemical Company (now ChevronPhillips Chemical Company), and Coopers and
Lybrand (now Priccwaterhousc Coppers). E-Mail: hannajb@auburn.edu
Robert E. Overstreet is a doctoral candidate in the College of Business at Auburn University. He is
an active duty Air Force Major and career logistician with 22 years of experience in both medical
and line logistics. He has published in the Air Force Journal of Logistics, International Journal of
Production Economics, and the Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management.
He has work forthcoming in the Journal ofApplied Social Psychology> and the International Journal
of Logistics Management. E-Mail: reo0003@aubum.edu
58

Journal of Transportation Management

CONCENTRATION IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY:
EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE?
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ABSTRACT
The early experience of the airline industry under deregulation was very much as expected, with
increased competition and new entrants offering highly competitive rates. However, there are
approximately 130 airlines operating today, and the industry remains more heavily concentrated than
it was prior to deregulation. This study reports on concentration in the US airline industry between
1970 and 2009, as measured by the Hcrfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and Concentration Ratio,
together with changes in industry costs. The results show a trend of industry-wide reduced costs per
available seat mile that is negatively correlated with the increased level of industry output over the
last 30 years and increased concentration, which demonstrate the need for more research into the
question of scale economies in air transportation.
INTRODUCTION
Prior to passing the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, members of Congress wanted to be
assured that eliminating federal economic
regulation would result in neither destructive
competition, nor increased concentration within
the industry, which could lead to the threat of
monopoly abuse or increased prices. Research
presented before Congress provided a very
convincing argument that neither condition
would develop (U.S. Senate, 1975; U.S. House,
1976; White, 1979; Kyle and Phillips, 1985;
Antoniou, 1991). Moreover, since there was no
investment in the way required, entry was
believed to be relatively easy due to low capital
requirements and the flexibility with which
equipment could be acquired, reassigned, and/or
retired (Harper, 1982; Levine, 1987; Dempsey,
1993). This belief of easy entry was reinforced
by the concept of Contestable Markets, which
suggested that the potential threat of entry could
keep prices down, even in markets with only one
competitor (Baumol, Bailey, and Willig, 1977;
Panzar and Willig, 1977; Bailey and Panzar,
1981). Thus, Congress passed the 1978
legislation with the belief that it would bring

about an increase in the number of competitors
and a decrease in the level of industry
concentration, leading to lower rates and better
service throughout the airline industry.
The early experience after deregulation was very
much as expected. There was a rush of new
entrants into the market, rates became highly
competitive, and the industry became less
concentrated. In 1978, there were 33 airlines
serving U.S. markets (A4A, 1979). In 1979, the
first year after deregulation, 18 new carriers
entered the market and another 13 entered the
following year. By 1985, there were 106 airlines
operating scheduled service in the US. (A4A,
1986). By the end of the decade, however, many
of the new carriers had exited the market and the
industry was more concentrated than ever (Kahn,
1988; Borenstein, 1992; Rakowski and Bejou,
1992; Dempsey, 1993; Brucckner and Spiller,
1994; Goetz and Sutton, 1997). This led Alfred
Kahn, former Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board and one of the strongest proponents of
deregulation, to question the outcome of the
1978 legislation (Kahn, 1988). Others actually
called for re-regulation of the industry
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(McGinley, 1989; Dempsey, 1990; Nomani and
Barrett, 1990). However, there was continued
belief in the positive results of deregulation and
strong support for the new environment
(Gattuso, 1986; GAO, 1991; TRB, 1991), so no
action was taken.
Throughout the 1990s, the trend toward fewer,
larger carriers continued due to bankruptcies and
mergers (TRB, 1999; DOT, 2001); however, new
competitors continued to enter the market, and
the overall number of carriers increased. By
1997, there were 99 airlines servicing U.S.
markets (A4A, 1998), compared to just 66 in
1991 (A4A, 1992). With the new millennium
came additional carriers, and in 2003, 150
airlines were providing service to U.S. markets
(A4A, 2004). As mergers and bankruptcies
reduced the number of carriers, they were
replaced in part by new ones. In 2004, there
were only 139 carriers, but by 2008 the number
was back up to 150 (A4A, 2006, 2009). Still,
questions regarding concentration in the airline
industry have continued, together with persistent
calls for re-regulation (Senate, 2001; Staff, 2001;
USDOJ, 2001; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008;
Lowy, 2010).
Increasing levels of industry concentration seem
contradictory to increasing numbers of
competitors, but studies noting levels of industry
concentration have not been published recently.
Yet levels from the late 1980s and early 1990s
appear to remain valid since complaints against
the industry continue to link bankruptcies and
merger activity to industry concentration and
“unreasonable” fares and poor service (GAO,
2006; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008; Lowy,
2010). However, questions arise as to whether
these concerns are justified. Moreover, it is
important to know whether the levels of
concentration in the airline industry have
continued to increase, or if the new carriers
entering the market in recent years have led to
reductions.
This study reports on changes in industry
concentration in the U.S. airline industry
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between 1975 and 2009. This study also reports
on changes in industry costs and revenues over
this period. The following section provides a
brief overview of the two most popular measures
of industry concentration, those used in this
study, and a review of previous studies of
concentration in the airline industry. This is
followed by a description of the data, and then
the results of the analysis are presented. Finally,
conclusions and suggestions for future research
are discussed.
MEASURING INDUSTRY
CONCENTRATION
The concept of industrial concentration has been
studied extensively over the years, and many
measures have been proposed. Bikker and Haaf
(2002) reviewed 10 different measures that had
been used in studies of concentration in the
banking industry. The two most common
measures include basic concentration ratios (CR)
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).
These measures are discussed briefly below, and
this is followed by a brief review of studies of
industry concentration in the U.S. airline
industry.
Concentration Ratios
Basie concentration ratios (CRk) measure the
proportion of industry revenue earned by the k
largest firms in the industry. The most frequently
used values of k are 4 and 8, providing the fourfirm (CR4) and eight-firm (CR ) measures,
respectively (Bain, 1951, 1954; Scherer and
Ross, 1990; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Snyman,
2010). Basic concentration ratios are seen as
inferior to other measures of concentration, such
as HHI, because they don't take into account the
behavior of any firms other than the four or eight
largest. Also, many different distributions of
those largest firms would result in equivalent
measures of CR4 and CRs. Despite these
shortcomings, concentration ratios have been
found to correlate highly with the HHI (Scherer
and Ross, 1990) and continue to be used.
Economists researching concentration ratios
have predominately looked for critical values of
measures that are positively correlated with

higher profitability (Schmalensee, 1987; Bikker
and Haaf, 2002). The idea being that when large
firms begin to behave as an oligopoly, their
profitability tends to increase because the large
firms can easily see what their competitors are
charging and charge a similar amount. Several
different numbers have been proposed as the
critical value, but for Clothe critical value
generally is considered to be between 45 and 55
percent, and for CR it is between 60 and 70
percent (Bain, 1951; Meehan and Duchesneau,
1973; Dalton and Penn, 1976).

between 1,000 and 1,800 is considered
moderately concentrated and mergers that create
an increase in HFII greater than 100 points raise
competitive concerns and need to be approved.
Finally, an industry with an HHI greater than
1,800 is considered highly concentrated, and
mergers causing an increase of greater than 50
points raise competitive concerns (USDOJ,
1997). As with concentration ratios, the HFII can
be measured using market shares expressed in
either dollar terms or physical terms, such as
units sold or revenue passenger miles (RPM).

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the
sum of the squared market shares for each firm
in a given industry (Rhoades, 1993; Naucnberg,
Basil and Chand, 1997; Bikker and Haaf, 2002).
This gives proportionally greater weight to firms
with large market shares and “reflects both the
distribution of the market shares of the top four
firms and the composition of the market outside
the top four firms” (Rhoades, 1993; USDOJ,
1997).
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is
generally accepted as a better measure of
industry concentration than basic CRs, and it is
the measure used by the U.S. Department of
Justice (USDOJ) in determining whether a
proposed merger deserves further investigation
before approval (USDOJ, 1997). The HHI
ranges from 0 to 10,000 for industries ranging
from perfect competition to monopoly. As an
example, an industry with four firms with the
following market shares (40, 30, 20, and 10)
would have a CR4 of 100% and a HHI of 3,000.
If the industry was more concentrated, as with
the following market shares (80, 10, 5, and 1),
the CR, would still be 100%, but the HHI would
be 6,526. Finally, for a monopoly the CR4 would
still be 100%, but the HHI would be 10,000.

STUDIES OF AIRLINE INDUSTRY
CONCENTRATION
By the end of the first decade of deregulation, it
was clear that the industry was changing
dramatically. This prompted a wave of research
assessing the results of deregulation. Several
studies analyzed the effects of mergers and
concentration on fares at the route-level or at
airports/hubs (Hurdle et al., 1989; Borenstein,
1990, 1991, 1992; Joesch and Zick, 1990;
Morrison and Winston, 1990; Abramowitz and
Brown, 1993; Kim and Singal, 1993). These
studies revealed mixed results, such that in some
cases fares were lower in heavily concentrated
markets and in others fares were higher. What
was revealed was that other factors must be
considered together with the level of
concentration. Others studies challenged the
Theory of Contestable Markets, noting that firms
may prevent entry of new carriers without
lowering prices. This could be accomplished by
development of Hub-and-Spoke Systems,
Frequent Flyer Programs, Computerized
Reservation Systems, Travel Agent Commission
Overrides, and control at "Fortress Hubs” of
airport slots and gates (Levine, 1987;
Borenstein, 1989, 1992; Fawcett and Farris,
1989; Hurdle ct al., 1989; Evans and Kessides,
1993b; Joesch and Zick, 1994).

According to the guidelines set forth by the
USDOJ and the Federal Trade Commission, an
industry with an HHI lower than 1,000 is
considered un-concentrated, and mergers need
not be analyzed. An industry with an HHI

Very few studies reported concentration at the
industry level, and most of these studies were
conducted during the wave of research that
assessed the effects of deregulation at the end of
the first decade of experience; very little
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attention has been given to industry-level of
concentration in recent years. Rakowski and
Bejou (1992) showed that in 1977, the largest 15
airlines controlled over 95 percent of the market
in terms of passenger revenues. The largest 8
controlled nearly 80 percent, and the largest four
controlled over half. By 1985, those numbers
were down to 91, 71, and 41, respectively.
However, by 1989 the concentration ratios were
back up above 1977 levels with the largest 15
carriers controlling 99 percent, the largest 8 with
over 91 percent, and the largest 4 at nearly 55
percent.
Borenstein (1992) reported the CR4, CRS, and
HHI for 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1990. The 4-firm
ratios were 56.2, 54.2, 64.8, and 61.5, for 1977,
1982, 1987, and 1990, respectively. The 8-firm
ratios were 81.1, 80.4, 86.5, and 90.5, for those
same years, and the HHIs were 1060, 930, 1230,
and 1210, respectively. Evans and Kessides
(1993a) reported measures of concentration for
the fourth quarters of 1978-1988. The CR4
decreased from the 4th quarter of 1978 to a low
of 38.4 by the 4th quarter of 1985; however by
the 4th quarter of 1988, it was back up to 45.5.
The CRX fell from 77.6 in 1978 to a low of 40.7
in 1985 and then increased to 78.0, its highest
level up to that point. The HHI fell from 930 in
the 4th quarter of 1978 to a low of 630 in 1985,
and rose steadily through 1988 to 870.
Brueckncr and Spiller (1994) showed a similar
pattern of change in industry concentration as
measured by Revenue Passenger Miles. They
reported the CR4 as 59.1, 53.6, and 59.1 for
1979, 1985, and 1988, respectively. Clearly, the
pattern was well established. The initial response
to deregulation was the entry of several new
carriers and more extensive competition, but by
the end of the decade, most of the new carriers
were gone, and the industry was more heavily
concentrated than it was prior to deregulation.
Mergers and bankruptcies have continued to
raise the ire of consumers and public policy
makers (Senate, 2001; Staff, 2001; US DOT,
2001; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008; Lowy,
2010), but little is known about the actual levels
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of concentration in the industry and its
relationship to overall fare levels and costs.
DATA
The data used in this analysis were obtained
from the annual reports published by the Airlines
for America (A4A). These reports, dating back
to 1937, report information on the general state
of the industry such as total revenue, expenses,
revenue passenger miles (RPM), available seat
miles (ASM), and names of all U.S. carriers with
scheduled passenger service. In addition to this
industry-wide information, similar financial and
production information is reported for the largest
carriers each year dating back to 1970 (A4A,
2009). Table 1 provides an overview of the U.S.
airline industry with respect to the number of
carriers, total passenger revenue, operating profit
and four measures of industry concentration for
the past 40 years. To show trends in pricing and
cost data, it was necessary to adjust dollar
figures for inflation. This was accomplished by
dividing by the implicit price deflator (IPD) as
reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(2011). The specific IPD used was based on
annual GDP with a base year of 2005.
NUMBER OF CARRIERS
An expected result of airline deregulation was an
increase in the number of carriers serving the
U.S. scheduled passenger service market
because of reduced barriers to entry. Figure 1
shows that the number of carriers has increased
dramatically since deregulation. Between 1978
and 1985, there was a significant increase in the
number of carriers with new entrants into the
market; however, during that period there were
also many small carriers that exited the market.
By 1985, 9 of the 34 airlines that existed in 1978
and 11 of the 17 that entered the market in 1979
had exited the market. The number of carriers
peaked in 1985, declined through 1991, and has
trended upward through 2009 with a few minor
declines.
With this significant growth in the number of
carriers, one would expect to see a
corresponding decrease in the concentration of

TABLE 1:
INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
Year

Number

Passenger

Operating

RPM

ASM

of

Revenue

Profit

(Billions)

(Billions)

Carriers

(S Billions)

(S Billions)

CR4

CR8

Mill

Gini
Index

1970

39

31.3

0.2

131.7

264.9

57

83

1,076

78

1971

36

32.2

1.2

135.7

279.9

56

82

1,037

76

1972

34

34.9

2.2

152.4

287.4

57

83

1,056

75

1973

35

36.5

2.1

162.0

310.6

54

83

1,024

76

1974

33

38.7

2.4

162.9

297.0

53

83

1,015

74

1975

34

36.8

0.3

162.8

303.0

53

82

995

74

1976

36

40.2

2.0

179.0

322.8

53

82

992

76

1977

34

43.1

2.4

193.2

345.6

52

81

978

74

1978

34

46.5

3.4

226.8

358.8

53

81

1,004

74

1979

50

52.0

0.5

262.0

416.0

50

79

901

81

1980

61

58.7

-0.5

254.2

431.2

49

80

920

83

1981

86

58.5

-0.8

248.8

432.5

47

76

853

87

1982

93

55.1

-1.3

259.0

424.9

47

77

854

87

1983

95

56.8

0.5

281.3

463.4

48

76

860

86

1984

95

61.8

3.6

304.5

514.0

46

74

817

86

1985

106

63.7

2.3

335.9

547.0

45

73

782

88

1986

98

63.6

2.1

366.3

606.8

48

74

833

87

1987

93

69.3

3.8

404.3

648.4

51

84

989

90

1988

77

75.4

5.2

423.3

648.7

53

85

1,027

89

1989

71

77.2

2.7

432.7

684.4

57

87

1,094

89

1990

67

80.9

-2.6

457.9

733.4

57

88

1,111

89

1991

66

76.2

-2.4

447.8

715.0

63

90

1.230

89

1992

70

78.0

-3.1

478.1

751.8

69

94

1,407

92

1993

80

81.7

1.8

489.1

770.8

69

93

1,407

92

1994

88

81.1

3.5

518.2

783.8

68

91

1,347

92

1995

95

85.1

7.2

540.4

806.6

67

89

1,312

92

1996

97

88.2

7.5

578.4

834.7

66

89

1,280

92

1997

99

93.9

10.2

605.4

860.6

66

89

1,278

92

1998

98

94.6

10.9

619.5

874.2

65

89

1,273

92

1999

94

96.9

9.1

651.6

917.8

64

89

1,233

92

2000

96

105.5

8.0

692.5

956.5

62

88

1,185

91

2001

100

89.2

-11.1

651.7

930.5

64

89

1,244

92

2002

141

79.5

-9.3

639.6

892.7

62

87

1,185

93

2003

150

81.8

-2.3

655.9

893.9

58

83

1,069

92

2004

140

88.5

-1.4

731.9

969.0

57

81

1,029

91

2005

139

93.4

0.3

779.0

1,003.3

55

83

1,028

91

2006

141

98.0

7.3

797.4

1,006.4

54

82

1,007

92

2007

151

100.7

8.7

829.0

1.037.1

53

81

968

91

2008

150

102.8

-3.3

81 1.4

1,020.1

61

83

1,188

92

2009

130

83.2

2.2

769.5

952.2

60

83

1,157

92
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FIGURE 1:
NUMBER OF U.S. AIRLINES 1975-2009

the industry and equality of carriers' market
share, especially if there were no economies of
scale. That is, if all carriers, regardless of size,
had the same costs per unit of output, the
concentration today should be lower than the
concentration was in 1975 because the new
entrants into the market would be able to take
significant amounts of market share from the
industry leaders. This is not the case, however,
and the following sections will illustrate that
industry concentration and inequality has
actually increased over this time period.
CONCENTRATION RATIOS
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the
annual four and eight firm concentration ratios
calculated using market shares measured in both
dollar sales and units sold between 1975 and
2009 as well as the most conservative (highest)
critical values of CRS and the range of critical
values for CR4. From this figure, it is obvious
that the airline industry is currently operating
above these critical values and has been for most
of, if not all of, the past 35 years. This suggests
that the industry is behaving as an Oligopoly and
is a highly concentrated industry. This can be
further verified by the fact that ticket prices for
the same lane among the largest airlines are
64
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generally very similar, and when checked
baggage fees were added in 2009 they were
added for all of the largest airlines, with the
exception of Southwest Airlines, which, as of
2011, doesn't charge a checked baggage fee but
frequently charges slightly higher ticket prices
than the other major national airlines. 1 lowever,
an industry behaving as an oligopoly should
have higher profitability (Bikker and Haaf,
2002), and this is not the case in the U.S. airline
industry, where industry profits per unit of
output have remained fairly constant over the
past 40 years.
HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX
Figure 3 shows the HHI calculated annually for
the U.S. airline industry from market shares
measured in terms of both dollar sales and units
sold. Both methods result in measures of Hill
that are very similar at every point in the sample.
This illustrates that the airline industry is
moderately concentrated and has been for most
of the past 35 years. It is also clear that when the
number of carriers was increasing, between 1978
and 1985, the concentration of the industry was
decreasing. However, when the number of
carriers began decreasing between 1985 and
1991, the concentration increased rapidly, and

FIGURE 2:
ANNUAL CR4 AND CRs of U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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did not decrease dramatically as more carriers
later began to enter the market. Therefore,
despite the fact that there are between 4 and 5
times as many carriers today as there were in
1978, the HHI is actually higher. The large firms
have increased their market share and the small
firms are dividing a decreasing percentage of the
market between them. This indicates that there is
some reason the large firms are able to increase
their power, whether it is due to economies of
scale, scope, or density.
INEQUALITY
When discussing industry concentration, it
makes sense to also discuss the related concept
of inequality of the distribution of market share
of the firms in the industry. A common way to
measure inequality is the Gini index (Damgaard
and Weiner, 2000). The Gini index is based on
Pareto’s law and is the ratio of the area between
a diagonal representing equal distribution and
the Lorenz curve and the area below a diagonal
representing equal distribution. In the Lorenz
curve, individuals are ranked by size, and the
cumulative percentage of carriers is plotted on
the x-axis against the corresponding cumulative
percentage of the market on the y-axis. In figure
4, the Lorenz curve for the U.S. airline industry
in 2009,

To make computation easier and avoid the
estimation of a formula for the Lorenz curve, the
following formula is an unbiased estimator of
the Gini index if the carriers are ranked by size
(Damgaard and Weiner, 2000), wherex. is the
size or market share of each carrier and // is the
average size of all carriers.
2

( )

Figure 5 shows the Gini index tor the U.S.
airline industry for the past forty years calculated
using size measured in both passenger revenue
and RPM. This shows that inequality in the
industry increased significantly immediately
following deregulation and has continued to do
Journal of Transportation Management

so. If there was no benefit to being a larger
carrier (no returns to scale or scope), we would
expect to see the industry approaching a more
equitable distribution of the market when in fact
the opposite has been the case. Furthermore, the
correlation between the Gini index and number
of carriers is 0.8165, indicating that as the
number of carriers increases so does the
inequality in market share between carriers.
These multiple measures of industry
concentration and inequality were examined to
clearly illustrate that the concentration of the
U.S. airline industry has been increasing since
deregulation despite the fact that there has been
a substantial increase in the number of firms.
While this alone, does not indicate economies of
scale or scope, it certainly raises questions as to
how the largest firms have been able to maintain
control of the marketplace and actually increase
market share w ith the near constant introduction
of new competitors. One possible explanation
might be that operating costs per unit of output
are actually lower for the larger carriers. If this
explanation is accurate, it would indicate the
presence of economies of scale, economies of
scope, or both in the airline industry.
COSTAND REVENUE PER PASSENGER
MILE (RPM)
Since 1975, there has been an increase in the
size of the airline industry as a whole. This can
be measured by revenue (dollar sales). RPM
(unit sales), or ASM (output). All three measures
have shown an increasing trend since 1975 and
can be seen in Figure 6. In order to fit data of
differing scales on the same graph and show the
increasing trends more clearly, revenue, RPM,
and ASM have been indexed with a base year of
1975 by dividing each year’s value by the value
from 1975. The revenue values were adjusted for
inflation before being indexed. Figure 6 clearly
shows an increasing trend in the size of the U.S.
airline industry, but it also shows that output and
units sold have been increasing more rapidly
than revenue. This is another indication of scale
economies and shows that costs have risen less
quickly than output.

FIGURE 4:
CALCULATION OF THE GINI INDEX

FIGURE 5:
GINI INDEX OF U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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Figure 7 shows the increase in billions of RPM
sold for what are, as of 2010, the three largest
airlines in the U.S. (United, American, and
Delta) for each year between 1975 and 2009.
This figure illustrates that not only has the entire
industry been increasing in size, but the largest
firms have also been increasing. Figure 7 also
shows that the period from 1979-1985 resulted
in a relative lack of growth for these three
carriers while the industry as a whole was
growing. This lack of growth for the large
carriers as the industry grew corresponds to what
was shown in figures 1-3, that the number of
firms increased in this time period and the
industry concentration, as measured by CR4,
CRS, and HHI, decreased.
Correlated to the growth of the industry was an
equally impressive decrease in both expenses
and revenue per RPM and ASM. This can be
seen in Figure 8. This figure is based on
monetary figures, which were adjusted for
inflation by dividing each year’s observation by

the corresponding I PD. This is another indicator
that economies of scale or scope may exist in the
airline industry. The correlation between
industry output (measured in either RPM or
ASM) and expenses per RPM is -0.86.
However, the fact that revenue per unit of output
has decreased at nearly the same rate indicates
that the carriers do not appear to be acting as
though they are market leaders in a concentrated
industry. Actually, the correlation between sales
per RPM and output is even higher at -0.96,
indicating that the price of air travel has
decreased more quickly than the cost of
providing air travel. For those interested in re
regulation, this raises the question of whether the
current state of the industry and competition is
bad for the consumer. Presumably the role of
regulation would be to help the consumer and
maintain competitiveness in the industry.
However, the industry seems to be lowering
prices even faster than expenses, suggesting that
competition is keeping prices low despite high
levels of industry concentration.

FIGURE 6:
ANNUAL INDEXED MEASURES OF INDUSTRY SIZE (1970=1)
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FIGURE 7:
ANNUAL RPM (BILLIONS) OF 2009’s 3 LARGEST CARRIERS
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The bottom line on Figure 8 illustrates the profit
per RPM, and this measure has stayed fairly
stable over the past 35 years. In fact, the entire
industry lost money 11 out of the past 35 years.
If this is a result of destructive competition,
there may be a need for regulation simply to
keep the large carriers from losing money or
requiring governmental monetary intervention to
avoid bankruptcy. The entire industry has lost
approximately $9 Billion since 2001. However,
this is more likely the result of a few large firms
losing a lot of money rather than all of the major
carriers losing money. Based on information
from their annual reports to the SEC, America
West and U.S. Airways combined, pre-merge,
and post merge losses since 2001 have totaled
close to $8 Billion, leading to the conclusion that
the rest of the industry only lost $1 Billion; this
includes at least 40 bankruptcies, with at least 12
of the bankruptcies resulting in the cessation of
operations.
These findings support reregulation of the airline
industry in that they provide evidence of
economies of scale, and a major reason for
deregulation was a multitude of studies showing
a lack of scale economies in the industry. The
industry has concentration ratios indicating that
it should be behaving as an oligopoly, all
measures of concentration show increased
concentration ratios since deregulation, and cost
per unit of output has steadily decreased as
output has increased. Contrary to this evidence is
the fact that price per unit of output has
decreased even faster than costs. This reduced
price is beneficial to consumers as long as
destructive competition does not drive prices
down so far that the established carriers are
forced out of business. However, it has been
pointed out that the majority of industry losses
over the past 9 years have been the result of two
carriers who merged.
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
The final piece of evidence that there may be
economies of scale in the U.S. airline industry is
the recent abundance of mergers and
acquisitions. If there are no cost benefits from
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increased size of operations, why are there so
many mergers? The following is an account of
some of the recent mergers: American Airlines
purchased the assets of the bankrupt Trans World
Airlines in 2001. America West and U.S.
Airways (both with recent bankruptcies) merged
in 2005 and integrated their operations in 2008.
Delta and Northwest merged in 2008. United
Airlines and Continental Airlines merged in
October of 2010. ExpressJet Airlines merged
with Sky West/ASA in November of 2010.
Finally, Southwest Airlines announced a merger
with AirTran Airways in September of 2010
which was finalized May 2, 2011.
While many carriers are merging operations,
there are also several instances of a single
holding company owning multiple carriers. This
would further suggest that the carriers see no
possibility of economies of scale. However, in
some cases, these are the same companies that
were previously mentioned. For example, Delta
Airlines owns Comair and operates it separately;
AMR Corporation owns American Airlines,
American Eagle, and Executive Airlines; U.S.
Airways Group owns U.S. Airways, Piedmont
Airline, Inc., and PSA Airlines; and Republic
Airline Holding owns Frontier, Republic, Shuttle
America, Chatauqua, and Midwest. This
indicates that mergers may not be attempts to
exploit economies of scale but may be due to
some other rationale.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper is intended to investigate the state of
the airline industry, show its increasing level of
concentration, and point out the need for further
investigation into the existence of scale
economies. Whether industry concentration is
measured by concentration ratios or the HHI, the
U.S. airline industry has been increasing in
concentration while also increasing in size and
number of carriers. The fact that large carriers
can increase market share in the presence of
increased competition seems to suggest the
existence of scale economies. Costs per unit of
output have been steadily decreasing as industry
output and output of the largest carriers has

increased. This is yet another indicator that scale
economies may exist. Finally, some air carriers
behave as though they will see a benefit from
merging with other carriers, indicating a belief or
hope that scale economies exist, while other
companies own multiple carriers without
merging operations, indicating that they see no
benefit from increasing the size of operations.
For this reason alone, it may be time to
reinvestigate the existence of scale economies in
the U.S. airline industry, so airline holding
companies will know if they could expect to see
reduced cost from merging operations instead of
operating multiple carriers.
For all of these reasons, the apparent shifts in
market structure as seen by changes in equality
in Figure 5, and the recent calls for re-regulation;
it seems as though there exists a need for further
investigation into the presence or absence of
economies of scale and scope in the U.S. airline
industry. Further validating this argument, is the
fact that the most recently published study into
this matter, while published in 2001, used data
from 1983-1989 (Creel and Farrell, 2001). This
means that an additional 20 years of available
data has not been included in any previous
studies on scale economies in the U.S. airline
industry. It is time for a thorough study using the
most up to date information to investigate the
existence of economies of scale, scope, and
density.
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COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND FUEL EFFICIENCY IN AVIATION
Adam D. Reiman
Alan W. Johnson
William A. Cunningham
Air Force Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
This paper builds upon a resource based view of competitive advantage under a dynamic capabilities
construct. Fuel efficiency measurement in the aviation industry can be incorporated into dynamic
capabilities such as strategic decision making and alliancing. These dynamic capabilities can drive
operational cost reductions, which in-turn can enhance profitability and establish a competitive
advantage. To further this advantage, fuel efficiency can be embedded inside an organizational
culture. A fuel efficiency focused organizational culture can be a valuable, rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable resource. This paper proposes a model to merge the dynamic capabilities of strategic
decision making and alliancing with organizational culture under fuel efficiency. Under this model,
a fuel efficiency index is introduced to drive behavior and provide accountability. Effective use of
the index has profit potential.
INTRODUCTION
A firm’s efficient utilization of resources can be
a source of competitive advantage. For the
aviation industry, the resource that makes up the
largest component of total cost is fuel. Aviation
industry fuel encompassed 20% of total costs in
2007 and United Airlines saw their cost of fuel,
as a percentage of total cost, vary between 10%
and 25% from 1973 to 2006 (Mazraati, 2010). A
dynamic capability to obtain the efficient use of
fuel and reduce those costs could lead to a
sustained competitive advantage.
Barney (1991) suggests a rationale for a resource
based view of sustained competitive advantage.
The two main assumptions of this view are that a
firm’s resources are heterogeneous and that
those resources may be immobile across firms.
In addition, resources that provide for a
sustained competitive advantage must be
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable.
Fuel is not rare or inimitable. Fuel as a resource
therefore will not provide for a sustained
competitive advantage. Yet, a firm's dynamic
capabilities properly applied to fuel efficiency
can achieve that advantage. Eisenhardt and
Martin (2000) expanded upon Barney’s resource
based view model by adding dynamic

capabilities as potential sources of sustained
competitive advantage.
AVIATION FUEL EFFICIENCY AND
DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES
Dynamic capabilities as defined by Eisenhardt
and Martin are those “‘organizational and
strategic routines by which firms achieve new
resource configurations as markets emerge,
collide, split, evolve and die.” Some examples
given of dynamic capabilities include alliancing,
product development and strategic decision
making. Eisenhardt and Martin suggest that
dynamic capabilities can be a source of
competitive advantage by altering a firm’s
resource base. The efficient utilization of fuel in
the aviation industry is dependent upon
alliancing, product development and strategic
decision making. A model for implementation of
a fuel efficiency strategy can be seen in Figure 1.
The model's three elements — strategic decision
making, supply chain fuel efficiency and an
organizational culture of fuel efficiency directly
impact a firm’s operational fuel efficiency.
Strategic decision making concerning fuel
efficiency involves strategic investment and
strategic planning. Strategic investment
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FIGURE 1
AVIATION INDUSTRY FUEL EFFICIENCY MODEL

involves the acquisition of aircraft, software,
ground equipment and infrastructure
improvements. Examples of each of these
categories can be seen in Table 1. The critical
factor in all of these strategic elements is to
consider their fuel efficiency impact on
operations. This impact is associated with a
purchased item’s fuel efficiency and weight.
Strategic investments need to consider weight
minimization as an important requirement.
Strategic planning involves location
management and process decisions. Location
management decisions include the basing of
aircraft, ground equipment, facilities and
maintenance repair capability. The goal of
location management is to optimize requirement
How with minimum fuel usage. Process
decisions include initial process design for fuel
efficiency, process redesign for fuel efficiency
and accountability for fuel efficiency. Metrics
need to be designed to drive behaviors that
increase fuel efficiency in these strategic areas.
Supply chain fuel efficiency involves alliancing.
Partnering with other firms in the supply chain
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can result in significant fuel efficiency
enhancements. Examples include information
technology collaboration that shares aircraft
schedules and loads with cargo distribution
centers to optimize load factors. Another
potential improvement area in alliancing fuel
efficiency comes from the increased load factors
associated with pooling. Pooling involves
sharing requirements to optimize load factors.
Gagnepain and Marin (2007) conclude that
airline alliances are able to lower prices because
they result in lower costs.
Organizational culture is not a dynamic
capability, but meets the valuable, rare,
inimitable and non-substitutable requirements of
a resource based view. Barney (1986) suggests
that organizational culture may be a source for
sustained competitive advantage. Achieving a
fuel efficiency focused organizational culture
involves the integration of the importance of fuel
efficiency as a core ingredient to the success of
the organization. Embedding fuel efficiency into
an organizational culture is difficult (Hatch,
1993).

TABLE 1
AVIATION INDUSTRY STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING FOR FUEL EFFICIENCY
Strategic Decision Making

Aircraft
Acquisition
More Fuel
Efficient Engines
Lighter Materials
and Components
Enhanced
Aerodynamics
Optimal Fleet Mix

Strategic Investment
Automation and
Ground
Optimization
Equipment
Softwa re
Acquisition
Acquisition
Route and
Schedule
Optimization for
Enterprise
Requirements at
Minimum Cost of
Fuel and Assets

Mission Handling
Equipment Fuel
Efficiency

Mission Support
Equipment Fuel
Efficiency

for Fuel Efficiency

Schein (1984) stressed the importance of the
structure of the firm and the firm’s reward
system during the development of organizational
culture. The process to embed fuel efficiency
into the culture requires measuring individual
contribution to fuel efficiency and then
establishing mechanisms that utilize that
contribution element as an important
consideration for promotion/reward. Leadership
involvement is also critical toward embedding
fuel efficiency in the organizational culture.
Fuel efficiency should be incorporated into
leadership communications to employees.
Organizationally, a top executive can be
assigned to oversee a firm’s overall fuel
efficiency effort. A committee can also be
established among top executives to discuss
strategic fuel efficiency opportunities.
Operational fuel efficiency can be greatly
enhanced by fuel efficiency strategic decision
making, supply chain fuel efficiency and an
organizational culture committed to fuel
efficiency. To align all of these sources of
competitive advantage together requires fuel
efficiency metrics. These metrics need to be
measured, analyzed and reported to key decision
makers. Accountability for metric performance
must be established in terms of both individual

Strategic Planning
Infrastructure
Improvements
Strengthening a
Runway to
Increase Load
Factors
Lengthening a
Runway to
Increase Load
Factors

Location

Process

Management

Aircraft Basing
Ground Equipment
Locations
Facility Locations

Initial Process
Design for Fuel
Efficiency
Process Redesign
for Fuel Efficiency

Maintenance Repai Accountability for
Capability

Fuel Efficiency

promotion/reward and fuel efficiency trends
needing management attention. The metrics
should be designed to influence positive
behaviors and issues where negative behaviors,
can positively impact a metric should be
highlighted and widely acknowledged.
FUEL EFFICIENCY INDEX
Fuel efficiency metrics in the transportation
industry are based upon several aggregate
measures of output. In the aviation industry, the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics includes air
revenue ton miles and air revenue passenger
miles (Lahiri et al, 2003). Internationally,
revenue ton kilometers and revenue passenger
kilometers are used (Owen, 2008). Assuming an
increase in these metrics is positive then
increasing revenues, distances and load factors
would result in a positive trend. The desired
objective of fuel efficiency is to move the
greatest quantity of cargo and passengers at the
least cost of fuel for a given distance, set of
assets and unit of time.
Ton miles and passenger miles should measure
the Great Circle Distance (GCD) between cargo
and passenger onload and offload as established
in Federal Regulations (Code of Federal
Regulations, 2010). Including GCD in the
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metric would allow the flight of more miles to
save fuel overall. Flying greater distances can
save fuel. Examples include flying farther to
find more favorable winds or flying farther to
obtain an Air Traffic Control routing that allows
for a higher, more fuel efficient altitude. Ton
miles and passenger miles still fail to take into
account fuel, so those metrics should be divided
by fuel used. The literature includes many
examples where fuel is incorporated with
passenger distance and cargo weight distance
(Lee et al, 2004; Hileman et al, 2008; Owen,
2008; Rutherford and Zcinali, 2009). Ton miles
per lbs of fuel consumed and passenger miles
per lbs of fuel consumed consider fuel and mass
transported over a given distance.
Hileman et al (2008) labeled these metrics
Payload Fuel Energy Efficiency (PFEE), but uses

fuel energy consumed instead of lbs of fuel
consumed. This metric excels as an aggregate
measure, but fails to take into account how an
increasing quantity of sorties can tend to
increase the measure of efficiency. For example,
if two sorties are performed exactly the same,
then the aggregate PFEE of both sorties is twice
the size for the PFEE of one sortie. The reason
for this is that both variables in Hileman et al’s
metric numerator are doubled while only one
term in the denominator is doubled. This effect
of increasing efficiency by increasing sorties is
eliminated by obtaining the sortie average.
Including the number of sorties n in the
denominator of PFEE operationalizes the Fuel
Efficiency Index (FEI) metric as seen in
equations (1) and (2).

TABLE 2
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND FEI BY MDS NOVEMBER 2010

Sorties
C-17A
C-5A
C-5B
C-5M
C-130E
C-130H
C-130J
KC-10A
KC-135R
KC-135T
Total
78

3110
74
251
4
317
675
188
107
358
60
5144

Great Circle
Distance (Nautical
Miles)
4471385
133192
542520
10375
64456
280850
145918
186420
494280
74927
6404322.45

Cargo
(Tons)
54406.05
1781.5
7494.2
116.25
860.55
2562.7
8.31.45
288.95
459.05
49.1
68849.8
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Fuel
Consumed
(1000 lbs)
220724
8141
31936
549
1661
6492
2587
14955
26663
5265
318971

Fuel Efficiency Index:
(GCD* Cargo)/
(FC* Sorties)
.354
394
507
550
105
164
249
34
24
12
269

THE DATA
Babikian ct al. (2001) demonstrated that
efficiency differences between regional and large
aircraft can be affected by sortie length. As the
proportion of large and small aircraft changes
over time, the overall FEI can be biased. To
remove this bias, the FEI in equations (1) and (2)
can be calculated on an aircraft type basis to
remove the bias of different aircraft type ratios
impacting the overall efficiency metric. To
obtain a better understanding of the fuel
efficiency index, 5,144 Air Mobility Command
military airlift sorties from November 2010 were
analyzed with respect to the proposed index.
Only channel, contingency or special assignment
airlift mission sorties were selected. A summary
of the index numbers broken down by aircraft
Mission Design Series (MDS) can be seen in
Table 2.
Note how the larger aircraft tend to have on
average better FEI scores with the C-5M scoring
highest. This trend for larger aircraft matches
Babikian et al’s results. Tanker aircraft (KC-10
and K.C-135) tend to have very low FEI scores
due to the limited cargo they carry and also due
to the fact that airlift is ancillary to their primary
mission of air refueling. The overall efficiency
numbers are at the lower end of their range due
to the prevalence of sorties with no cargo. Of all
the sorties observed, 22% had no cargo. Sorties
at the top of the efficiency range had FEI
measuring in the thousands. Table 3 includes the
descriptive statistics for all of the FEIs.
From the descriptive statistics, note that the
standard deviation is larger than the mean. This

suggests a large dispersal of the data. There are
a few outliers at the top of the range that are
associated with bad data. A couple of cases
included diverts back to the origin, but failed to
change the city pair. This resulted in extremely
low fuel usage for a long distance resulting in a
false FEI. In the cases of diverts, it is important
to record the destination as the same as the
origin. Finally, the mean is much larger than the
median suggesting influence by a few outliers at
the top of the range.
GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCE
After examining the descriptive statistics of FEI,
the data was analyzed to assess the impact of
great circle distance. If greater distances lead to
better FEIs, than shifting the fleet to more long
distance missions might improve the FEI
measure. Increased distance tends to decrease
payload capacity. This can be seen in Brcguet
Range equation (3) (Lee et al, 2004). V is the
flight speed, L/D is the lift to drag ratio, g is the
gravitational acceleration constant, SFC is
specific fuel consumption and W is weight. The
equation shows a tradeoff between fuel weight
and payload weight.

If Air Mobility Command aircraft were operating
at maximum payload, then as distance increases,
payload decreases counteracting the increase in
FEI. When not operating at maximum payload,
similar payloads will result in a higher FEI for
aircraft that move the cargo farther. To isolate
the bias of differing MDS aircraft, the

TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR AIR MOBILITY COMMAND FEI
NOVEMBER 2010
Mean FEI
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Count

267.41
332.32
0
5188.57
5144
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FIGURE 2
C-17 GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCE AND FEI

FIGURE 3
C-5 GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCE AND FEI
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comparison of distance to FEI was made for the
C-17 and the C-5. For the C-5, the A, B and M
models were included together. The results were
plotted in Figures 2 and 3.
Both of the plots show an increase in FEI for
longer distance city pairs. The overall
correlation between GCD and FEI is 44%. The
only method that a manager could use to
increase GCD is to overtly an intermediate
location or discover longer distance city pairs to
replace city pairs currently being used. If these
sorties were operating at maximum payload
before the transition, than a payload penalty
would exist for going to longer distances. Yet, if
the sorties were tlying with a suboptimal
payload, then they could fly a longer range with
the same payload and increase FEI.
LOAD FACTORS
To enhance the effectiveness of the FEI, it
should be reported along with load factors. The
benefit of the load factor is that it is a ratio of the
actual load to the optimal load. This information
provides important insight into how cargo
loading efficiency influences FEI. Load factors
can have two limiting factors. These factors
include weight limitations and volume
limitations. The volume limitation or cube is a
matter of dimension. It is based on the surface
area of the cargo floor and the height of the
cargo door. It is often measured as a ratio of
pallet positions used over pallet positions
available. If a cargo compartment is cubed out
(pallet positions used equals pallet positions
available) and cargo of greater density is not
available (assuming below payload maximum)
then the horizontal optimal configuration was
achieved. In order to achieve optimality for the
vertical, a metric should be added for the load
factor of the pallet. It should be noted that
calculating pallet load factors could be complex
if accuracy is a primary concern. To simplify
pallet load factors, a ratio of the height of the
pallet to the maximum allowable height might
be preferable.

The weight limitation is more complex. Pallets
and aircraft cargo floors have a weight
limitation. The limits of these must be observed.
The aircraft also has a maximum gross takeoff
weight which is dependent upon several
variables. The first constraint is an airframe
limit. This airframe limit can be reduced based
upon several variables. These variables include
pavement strength, runway length, altitude,
temperature, obstacles and runway winds. With
the maximum gross weight for takeoff
determined, cargo available equals maximum
gross takeoff weight minus operating weight
minus fuel on board. The fuel on board is a
calculation based on many factors.
The primary factor is the distance to the next
fueling point. Other considerations include
icing, thunderstorms, weather at origin and
destination, distance to alternate, airframe
specific fuel degrade, cargo weight, routing,
altitude and winds. Due to the complexity of all
of these factors, determination of the exact
maximum payload is extremely difficult and
often requires iterative algorithms. Computer
flight planning software can calculate the value
of payload maximum (PM AX) and those values
should be calculated and recorded for every
sortie flown. For passengers, the load factor is
based on percentage of seats filled. See
equations (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) for load
factors. The behaviors desired from these
metrics include maximizing the pallet loads and
completely filling the aircraft.
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Load factors for passengers in the aviation
industry grew from 60 to 80% from 1990 to
2008 and load factors for commercial cargo
remained flat around 60% over the same time
period (Hileman et al, 2008). To contrast against
industry data, load factors for the Air Mobility
Command data set were gathered. Payload
maximum was determined using equation (9).
Actual ramp fuel was used to aid in
simplification, but operationally the load factors
need to be determined before the ramp fuel is
loaded. Payload maximum is not routinely used
by Air Mobility Command’s command and

control staff, but its value is critical to accurate
load factor determination during planning.
Payload maximum is dependent on Maximum
Gross Takeoff Weight. For the analysis, the
Maximum Gross Takeoff Weight used was the
maximum for the aircraft. Other variables that
could further reduce Maximum Gross Takeoff
Weight include airfield pavement strength
limitations and departure obstacles. Their
inclusion would serve to improve load factors.
The cargo load factors for Air Mobility
Command can be seen in Tabic 4. The Air
Mobility Command cargo load factor is lower

TABLE 4
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND LOAD FACTOR NOVEMBER 2010
Maximum Gross
Takeoff Weight
C-17A
C-5A
C-5B
C-5M
C-130E
C-13011
C-130J
KC-10A
KC-135R
KC-135T

82

585
769
769
769
155
155
155
590
322.5
322.5
Total
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Empty Weight

Load Factors

282.5
380
380
380
90
90
90
241
119.23
119.23

23%
23%
31%
28%
15%
21%
27%
3%
3%
2%
22%

FIGURE 4
C-17 LOAD FACTOR AND FEI

FIGURE 5
C-5 LOAD FACTOR AND FEI
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than industry by a factor of 3. This illustrates
the need for the operationalization of the load
factor metric into Air Mobility Command
planning, command and control. Each sortie’s
load factor needs to be highlighted when the
value falls below a firm’s specific threshold.
Load factor feedback control systems can have a
positive impact on the fuel efficient operation of
the enterprise.
Strategic airlift airframes were selected from the
data for more detailed analysis. To better
understand the impact of load factors on FEE
load factors were plotted against FEI for both the
C-17 and the C-5 as seen in Figures 4 and 5. In
both cases, a positive correlation is seen between
increasing load factors and the FEI. Overall,
there exists a 74% correlation between load
factor and FEI. This is almost twice as large as
the 44% correlation with GCD. There are
several data points outside 100% load factors.
These are suspected to be due to waivers that
allow for loading more cargo than Maximum
Gross Takeoff Weight. One other item of note is
the increasing variance of FEI as load factors

increase. This was also apparent in the
analysis of GCD.
INACTIVE SORTIES
Aircraft often need to reposition to pick up
cargo and deposition after delivering cargo.
This reduces load factors by driving up the
number of no cargo sorties. It also reduces
FEI due to the zeroing of the numerator.
Inactive sorties drive the desire to either stage
aircraft out of heavy cargo and passenger
requirement locations or to select aircraft that
are nearest to the cargo and passenger
requirement onload or offload locations. A
metric that is proposed to handle the efficiency
of aircraft selection to meet this requirement is
inactive miles per inactive sortie as seen in
equation (10). An inactive mile is defined as a
mile flown to position an aircraft at a cargo
onload location or to deposition an aircraft
from a cargo offload location. An inactive
sortie is a sortie composed of inactive miles.
The behavior desired is to drive aircraft
staging to where the cargo is located or to
select an aircraft for a mission that is closest to
the cargo onload and offload.

TABLE 5
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND INACTIVE MILES PER SORTIE NOVEMBER 2010

Inactive Sorties

Inactive Miles

Inactive Miles Per Sortie

C-17A
C-5 A
C-5B
C-5M

960
33
98
2

C-130E
C-130H
C-130J

40
49
31
37
77
7

1186113
27453
129808
5188
18876
47441
29748
88638
163989
7493

1236
832
1325
2594
472
968
960
2396
2130
1070
1398

KC-10A
KC-135R
KC-135T

Average
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Inactive Miles per Sortie =

n

where n = # of inactive sorties

(10)

FIGURE 6
C-17 FUEL CONSUMED AND FEI

FIGU RE 7
C-5 FUEL CONSUMED AND FEI
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The results of the inactive miles per sortie
analysis on an MDS basis for Air Mobility
Command can be seen in Table 5. The tankers
have to travel the longest to get their
requirements. Inactive miles appear to decrease
with aircraft size after that. Although this metric
is broken down on a per MDS basis, it could be
analyzed on a departure airfield basis to discover
which units have the farthest to travel for
positioning and depositioning. From these
results, insights into potential staging
opportunities could be an area for further
research.
FUEL
After examination of the effects of Great Circle
Distance and Load Factors on FEI. the final
variable that is part of FEI is fuel consumed. An
examination of fuel consumed against FEI was
plotted in Figures 6 and 7. To aid in visibility
for the C-17 plot, three outliers were removed.
The expected behavior is that as fuel consumed

increases, FEI should decrease. The opposite
occurs in actuality. There arc two suspected
reasons for this. First, there is a 78% correlation
between GCD and fuel consumed and the FEI
increase associated with increasing GCD
outweighs the additional fuel burned. Second,
sorties with higher load factors bum more fuel.
A potential solution to provide greater sensitivity
to fuel consumed would be to square the fuel
consumed in the denominator of the FEI
equation.
When extra fuel is carried on board an aircraft,
the added weight of that fuel bums additional
fuel unnecessarily. Due to this cost of carrying
additional fuel, it is often desired to ensure that
no more fuel is added to a mission than planned.
This illustrates the need for a metric that
represents fueling accuracy as seen in equation
(11). In addition to reducing the cost to carry
fuel, it is often desired to have the aircraft fly the
most fuel efficient flight profile. This is

• 11 '

TABLE 6
FUELING ACCURACY AND FUEL BURN RATIO

C-17A
C-5A
C-5B
C-5M
C-130E
C-130 FI
C-130J
KC-10A
KC-135R
KC-135T
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Average Fueling Accuracy

Average Fuel Bum Ratio

97%
95%
98%
100%
100%
99%
93%
96%
92%
97%

1.03
0.98
0.98
1.02
1.00
1.01
1.11
0.98
1.00
1.00
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complicated by load factors and distances
involved. To remove these and other sortie
specific factors, a contrast could be made
between a planned fuel burn and the actual fuel
bum. To drive this behavior, equation (12)
measures a planned over actual fuel bum ratio.
The goal of the metric is to maximize the ratio
by minimizing actual fuel bum.
Differences between planned and actual fuel
burn are subject to multiple variables. Many of
these variables are outside of the pilot’s control
while some can be manipulated. Variables
outside of the pilot’s control include winds
different than planned, achievable altitude below
planned, icing/thunderstorms/turbulence altering
routings and/or altitude and decreased engine
performance. Variables within the pilot’s control
include throttle setting, not Hying planned
routings and altitudes (not influenced by external
constraints) and climb/descent profiles. Since
the ratio of planned fuel burn to actual fuel bum
does not distinguish between aspects of fuel
burn that are within the pilot’s locus of control,
the metric could be unjustly punitive. Despite
this drawback, the metric does distinguish
discrepancies from planned fuel bum and drives

behavior to lower fuel bum. Air Mobility
Command data for average fueling accuracy and
average fuel bum by aircraft can be seen in Table 6.
From the table, note the high fueling accuracies.
These high accuracies are due to the way the
planned ramp fuel is calculated. The Air
Mobility Command Fuel Data Tracker will set
the planned ramp fuel equal to actual ramp fuel
if the ramp fuel deviation reason was outside of
the pilot’s control. This aids in unjust
attribution, but skews the data toward the high
end of accuracy. The fuel bum ratio provides
little information from an aircraft perspective. It
might suggest something about the quality of the
fuel planning or it could be a sign of something
cultural in that aircraft’s community. The fuel
burn ratio could be more effectively used by
comparing organizational units. It could also be
used to compare pilots.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR
CITY PAIR ANALYSIS
FHI increased with GC'D, load factor and fuel
consumed. To get a better understanding of the
sensitivity of FEI to load factor and fuel
consumed, a specific city pair was selected.

FIGURE 8
KDOV-ETAR C-17 LOAD FACTORS AND FEI
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FIGURE 9
KDOV-ETAR C-17 FUEL CONSUMED AND FEI

This enabled distance to become constant
leaving cargo and fuel as the remaining
variables. Dover to Ramstein was a common
city pair in the data set with 20 observations.
Note that managing FEI by city pair might be
time consuming and effort should be
concentrated on frequent city pairs. C-17s were
selected for the analysis to further constrain the
variables by limiting aircraft type. The results
can be seen in Figures 8 and 9.
Figure 8 shows how the amount of fuel
consumed varies for a fixed distance and load
factor, while Figure 9 shows how the amount of
cargo varies for a fixed distance and fuel
consumed. The Figure 8 relationship is useful
for managers in that it identifies sorties that
deviate from previous observations based on fuel
efficiency. The ability to identify sorties that
exceed a predetermined interval on the
regression of that city pair could highlight
outliers in both fuel efficiency and fuel
inefficiency. In depth analysis of those outliers
in terms of root cause could expose
opportunities for greater fuel efficiency. Specific
aircraft tails or aircrews might repeatedly occur
88
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outside the interval representing the need for
possible remedial action.
From Figure 8, note the tight scatter of points
about the simple linear regression. The R for
this regression is .82. This indicates that load
factor when constricted by city pair explains
most of the variability in FEI. Figure 8 also aids
in understanding that to target an FEI near 1000
requires an 80% load factor. From Figure 9,
note that the points have much greater variance
about the line. The R for this regression is .45.
This indicates that fuel consumed when
constricted by city pair explains only 45% of the
variability in FEI. Taking a vertical slice of
Figure 8 shows load factor replicates with the
variance between the data points being explained
by fuel consumed. Using a band about the
regression line for a city pair in Figure 8 could
highlight missions that consume too much or too
little fuel contrasted against the aggregate.
Further analysis into those missions could
potentially highlight fuel savings opportunities.

INCORPORATING METRICS INTO
THE AVIATION INDUSTRY FUEL
EFFICIENCY MODEL
Application of FFJ operationally can drive
desired behaviors to increase load factors, reduce
inactive miles and reduce fuel usage. Reducing
fuel consumption might best be addressed
through the banding method of the regression
line in the Dover to Ramstein example. FEI has
value beyond operational application. To obtain
the optimal value from FEI, the metric should be
applied to all of the components of the Aviation
Industry Fuel Efficiency model. The first
component of the model requiring the
application of FEI is strategic decision making.
FEI should be implemented in both the strategic
investment and strategic planning components of
strategic decision making,
From a strategic investment perspective, the FEI
metric can drive aircraft acquisition
requirements and allow for innovative paradigm
shifts. The FEI minimum for several set
distances can be specified as the requirement.
Since FEI does not include time as a variable,
that should be constrained to a set maximum
when building the requirement to avoid
solutions that are too slow. FEI also fails to
address reliability. The C-5 has superior FEI on
average, but suffers from reliability issues. This
needs to be addressed when making strategic
investments such as aircraft acquisition. Larger
aircraft might be superior in terms of FEI, but
might suffer mechanically due to their size and
complexity. Infrastructure improvements
enhancing load factor potential such as
pavement strengthening can be assessed based
upon FEI impact. Strategic airfield
improvements could result in increased cargo
flow and more efficient operations. Ranking
airfield improvement projects by FEI impact can
be an important factor when considering
prioritization.
Beyond strategic investment, FEI could be
extremely useful in strategic planning. FEI and

inactive miles would be very useful for the
determination of aircraft basing and staging
locations. Those metrics would also be very
useful from a theory of constraints perspective
by highlighting the least efficient aircraft and
mission pairings. Automatically calculating the
FEI planning metric once an aircraft has been
assigned to the mission and highlighting poor
FEIs and inactive miles could provide planning
and aircraft allocation functions immediate
feedback for correction. Individual planners and
aircraft allocators can be held accountable using
FEI and inactive miles as performance metrics.
Beyond individuals, organizational goals can be
established regarding both the FEI and inactive
miles.
Implementation of the FEI should extend beyond
the firm when the FEI is dependent upon other
firms in the supply chain. Suppliers performing
functions such as warehousing and distribution
that are tied to air mobility should be provided
information on their FEI impact. In addition,
strategic partnering should be encouraged to
enhance load factors. Alliances should be
examined that offer the greatest potential to
increase the FEI. Shared investments on
information technology, automated identification
and tracking and cargo distribution equipment
might offer FEI improvements that justify the
acquisition. Suppliers need to be properly
rewarded for their investments to enhance FEI.
Strategic decision making and supply chain fuel
efficiency can be greatly improved through the
use of the FEI. Yet, there are areas of
improvement in FEI that can only be achieved
by those operational workers executing the
process. To reap those benefits, FEI needs to be
embedded into organizational culture.
Attempting to embed a metric into
organizational culture and simultaneously using
the metric as a tool for accountability is difficult.
The problem is that individuals tend to rebel
against punitive metrics. For acceptance, it is
preferred to use the metric in a positive role until
it becomes accepted as part of the organization.
It is important to include the metric when
Fall/Wintcr 2011
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measuring operations at every level. Obtaining
leadership support for the metric is essential.
FEI needs to be presented at senior level
meetings and included in organizational goals.
Finally, FEI should be part of the reward
structure for promotion for factors within the
individual’s control. This could include
individual awards for sustained high FEI
performance to highlighting the metric during
promotion discussions.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
The Aviation Industry Fuel Efficiency model
presents a framework for transforming fuel
efficiency into a sustained competitive
advantage. This is achieved through the use of
the dynamic capabilities of strategic decision
making and alliancing. In addition to those
dynamic capabilities, the model recommends
ingraining fuel efficiency into the organizational
culture. To assist the manager in implementing
the model, the FEI was introduced. The FEI
drives desired behaviors to increase load factors,
decrease inactive miles and reduce fuel
consumed. Other metrics were suggested to
further assist the manager in improving fuel
efficiency behaviors to include load factors,
inactive miles per sortie, fueling accuracy and
fuel burn ratio. It is important to measure load
factors from both a weight and cube perspective,
to obtain a better understanding of the efficiency
of operations.
Measuring FEI operationally can drive behaviors
toward increased fuel efficiency, but application
of the FEI to the model is where a firm can
leverage much greater fuel efficiency benefits.
Extending the FEI to strategic decision making,
supply chain partners and the organizational
culture will allow the firm’s fuel efficiency
focused resources to not be easily imitated.
There arc certain risks associated with greater
fuel efficiency integration within the supply
chain and strategic fuel efficiency investments.
These risks need to be thoroughly analyzed.
There are also risks to not integrating or not
investing in an environment of rising fuel prices.
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Following a fuel efficiency strategy will make
the firm and the Finn’s supply chain less
susceptible to rising fuel prices. A fuel
efficiency strategy will also increase a firm’s
ability to compete on price.
The FEI ties together all of the components of
the model. It enables individual, organizational,
corporate, supply chain and industry goals to
align. This common sense of purpose can only
be achieved if the metric is valued equally. FEI
could support aircraft manufacturers,
distribution centers, command information
systems, planning systems and allocation. Much
as a low cost retailer is less susceptible to
economic downturns, a fuel efficient firm in the
aviation industry is less susceptible to fuel price
increases. A fuel efficiency strategy is a risk
reduction strategy with opportunities for expert
practitioners to obtain a sustained competitive
advantage.
REFERENCES
Babikian, R., Lukachko, S.P. and Waitz I.A.
(2001), “Historical Fuel Efficiency
Characteristics of Regional Aircraft from
Technological, Operational and Cost
Perspectives,” Journal ofAir Transport
Management, 8(6): 389-400.
Barney, Jay (1991), “Finn Resources and
Sustained Competitive Advantage,” Journal of
Management, 17( 1): 99-120.
Barney, Jay (1986), “Organizational Culture:
Can it be a Source of Sustained Competitive
Advantage,” Academy of Management Review\
11(3): 656.
Code of Federal Regulations (2010), “Title 14:
Aeronautics and Space,” Office of the Secretary,
Department of Transportation, See 19-5.
Eiscnhardt, K. M. and Martin, J. A. (2000),
“Dynamic Capabilities: What are They?”
Strategic Management Journal, 21 (10/11):
1105-1121.

Gagnepain, P., Marin, P. (2007), “The Effects of
Airline Alliances: What do the aggregate Data
Say?,” Journal of the Spanish Economic
Association, 1(3): 251-276.
Hatch, M. (1993) “The Dynamics of
Organizational Culture,” Academy of
Management, 18(4): 657-693.
Hileman, J., Katz, J., Mantilla, J. and Fleming,
G. (2008), Payload Fuel Energyt Efficiency as a
Metric for Aviation Environmental Performance.
1CAS 2008 Proceedings.
Lahiri, K., Steklcr, H. O., Yao, V. W. and Young,
P. (2003), Monthly Output Index for the
U.S. Ttransportation Sector, University at
Albany, Department of Economics - Suny.

Lee, J., Lukachko, S., and Waitz, I. (2004),
“Aircraft and Energy Use,” in Encyclopedia of
Energy (pp. 29-38) Massachusettes Institute of
Technology: Elsevier Inc.
Mazraati, M. (2010), "'WorldAviation Fuel
Demand Outlook, ” OPEC Energy Review.
Owen, M. (2008), "Fuel Efficiency Development
and Prediction, ” OMEGA, Manchester
Metropolitan University.
Rutherford, D. and Zeinali, M. (2009),
“Efficiency Trends for New Commercial Jet
Aircraft,” International Council on Clean
Transportation, Washington DC.
Schein, E. (1984), “Coming to a New Awareness
of Organizational Culture,” Sloan Management
Review, 25(2): 3-15.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Adam I). Reiman is a doctoral student in logistics at the Air Force Institute of Technology. He
received a M.S. degree in Logistics Management from AFIT, and his research interests include fuel
efficiency, routing optimization and transportation planning. Email: reiman.adam@gmail.com
Alan VV. Johnson is an associate professor of logistics and supply chain management at the Air
Force Institute of Technology. He received an M.S. degree from AFIT and a Ph.D. in industrial and
systems engineering from Virginia Tech. His research interests include system reliability and
maintainability modeling, transportation planning, and space logistics. Email:
alan.johnson@afit.edu
William A. Cunningham III is professor of logistics and supply chain management at the Air Force
Institute of Technology. He received an M.S. degree from Oklahoma State University, and a Ph.D.
degree from the University of Arkansas. His research interests include transportation management,
transportation economics and supply chain management. Email: william.cunningham@afit.edu

Fall/Winter 2011

91

Guidelines for Submission/Publication
GENERAL
1. Editor Contact Information - Dr. John C. Taylor, Associate Professor of Supply Chain
Management, Department of Marketing and Supply Chain Management, School of Business, Wayne
State University, Detroit, MI 48202. Office Phone: 313 577-4525. Cell Phone: 517 719-075. Fax:
313 577-5486. Email: taylorjohn@wayne.edu
2. Articles should be submitted electronically to Dr. Taylor at taylorjohn@wayne.edu.
3. Articles should be submitted using Microsoft Word for Windows in either doc or doex formats.
Articles prepared on Mac systems should be saved in Word for Windows compatible format.
Accepted articles, in final form, arc also submitted via email.
4. Article length should be in the range of 6000-7000 words including references. Tables and figures
are in addition to the word count. However articles including all text, references, appendixes, tables
and figures (but excluding front matter) should not exceed 30 double spaced pages in the format
described below. Shorter articles are also acceptable. It will be difficult to publish articles much
longer than 7000 words.
FRONT MATTER
1. First Page - Title of the paper, name and position of the author(s), author(s) complete address(es)
and telephone number(s), e-mail address(cs), and any acknowledgment of assistance. Times New
Roman with 12 point font.
2. Second Page - A brief biographical sketch of each author including name, degree(s) held, title or
position, organization or institution, previous publications and research interests. Include each
author’s email address at end. Maximum of 90 words per author. Times New Roman with 12 point
font.
3. Third Page - Title of the paper without author name(s) and a brief abstract of no more than 125
words summarizing the article in Times New Roman 12 point font. The abstract serves to generate
reader interest in the full article.

Journal of Transportation Managem

FORMATTING
1. Manuscripts should be typed, double-spaced (body of text only).
2. The entire manuscript should have 1" margins on all sides.
3. Text body font should be Times New Roman 12 point.
4. The entire manuscript must be typed LEFT-JUSTIFIED, with the exception of tables and figures.

TITLE PAGE AND ABSTRACT PAGE (after 3 pages of Front Matter)
1. The manuscript title should be printed in Times New Roman 12 point and in all capital letters and
bold print.
2. Author(s) and affiliation(s) are to be printed in upper and lower case letters below the title.
Author(s) are to be listed with affiliation(s) only. Times New Roman 12 point.
3. The abstract should be 125 words or less on a separate Abstract Page. Title should be repeated as
in 1) followed by ABSTRACT in caps, bolded and 12 point also. The abstract should be in 12 point
font.
BODY OF MANUSCRIPT
1. Main headings are 12 point, bolded and in all caps (please do not use the small caps function).
2. First level headings are 12 point, upper/lower case and bolded.
3. Second level headings are 12 point upper/lower case.
4. The body is NOT indented; rather a full blank line is left between paragraphs.
5. A full blank line should be left between all headings and paragraphs.
6. Unnecessary hard returns should not be used at the end of each line.
TABLES AND FIGURES
1. ONLY Tables and Figures are to appear in camera-ready format! Each table or figure should be
numbered in Arabic style (i.e., Table 1, Figure 2).
2. All tables MUST be typed using Microsoft Word for Windows table functions. Tables should
NOT be tabbed or spaced to align columns. Column headings should not be created as separate
tables. Table titles should NOT be created as part of the table. Table Titles should be 12 point upper
case and bold. All tables MUST be either 3 1/4 inches wide or 6 7/8 inches wide.

Fall/Winter 2011

3. All graphics MUST be saved in one of these formats: TIFF or JPG.
4. Tables and figures are NOT to be included unless directly referred to in the body of the manuscript.
5. Please remember that JTM is printed in black and white. Use of color and/or shading should be
avoided.
6. For accepted manuscripts, each table and/or figure should be printed on a separate page and included
at the end after References with the Table Title at the top in 12 point, upper case and bold.
7. Placement of tables and figures in the manuscript should be indicated as follows:

Table or Figure (#) About Here

EQUATIONS, CITATIONS, REFERENCES, ENDNOTES, APPENDIXES, ETC.
1. Equations are placed on a separate line with a blank line both above and below, and numbered in
parentheses, Hush right. Examples:
y = c + ax + bx
y = a + lx + 2x + 3x + ax
2. References within the text should include the author’s last name and year of publication enclosed in
parentheses, c.g. (Wilson, 2004; Manrodt and Rutner, 2004). For more than one cite in the same
location, references should be in chronological order. For more than one cite in the same year,
alphabetize by author name, such as (Wilson, 2001; Mandrodt, 2002; Rutner, 2002; Wilson, 2003). If
practical, place the citation just ahead of a punctuation mark. If the author’s name is used within the
text sentence, just place the year of publication in parentheses, c.g., “According to Manrodt and Rutner
(2003) ...,”. For multiple authors, use up to three names in the citation. With four or more authors, use
the lead author and et al., (Wilson et al., 2004). References from the Internet should contain the site
name, author/organization if available, date the page/site w as created, date page/site was accessed, and
complete web addresses sufficient to find the cited work.
3. Endnotes may be used when necessary. Create endnotes in 10-point font and place them in a separate
section at the end of the text before References. (1,2, etc.). Note: Endnotes should be explanatory in
nature and not for reference purposes. Endnotes should NOT be created in Microsoft Insert Footnotes/
Endnotes system. The Endnotes section should be titled in 12 point, uppercase and bolded.
4. All references should be in block style. Hanging indents are not to be used.
5. Appendices follow the body of the text and references and each should be headed by a title of
APPENDIX (#) in caps and 12 Point, and bolded.
6. The list of references cited in the manuscript should immediately follow the body of the text in
alphabetical order, with the lead author’s surname first and the year of publication following all author
names. The Reference Section should be headed with REFERENCES in caps, bolded, and in 12 point
font. Work by the same author with the same year of publication should be distinguished by lower case
Journal of Transportation Management

letters after the date (e.g., 1996a). For author names that repeat, in the same order, in subsequent
cites, substitute a .5 inch underline for each name that repeats. Authors’ initials should have a space
between the initials, e.g., Smith, Jr., H. E., Timon, III., P. S. R., etc. A blank line should separate each
reference in the list. Do not number references.
7. All references to journals, books, etc., are italicized, NOT underlined. Examples are as follows:
Journal Article:
Pohlen, Terrance L. (2003), “A Framework for Evaluating Supply Chain Performance,” Journal of
Transportation Management, 14(2): 1-21.
Book Chapter:
Manrodt, Karl (2003), “Drivers of Logistics Excellence: Implications for Carriers,” In J. W. Wilson
(Ed.), Logistics and Transportation Research Yearbook 2003 (pp. 126-154) Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Book:
Coyle, John J., Bardi, Edward J., and Novaek, RobertA. (2004), Transportation, 6th ed., Cincinnati,
OH: South-Western College Publishing.
Website:
Wilson, J. W. (2003), “Adapting to the Threat of Global Terrorism: Reinventing Your Supply
Chain,” [On-line]. Available: http//:georgiasouthern.edu/coba/centers/lit/threat.doc. Created: 11/01/
02, Accessed: 11/12/03.
MANUSCRIPT SAMPLE
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE
Terrance L. Pohlen, University of North Texas
ABSTRACT
Managers require measures spanning multiple enterprises to increase supply chain competitiveness
and to increase the value delivered to the end-customer. Despite the need for supply chain metrics,
there is little evidence that any firms arc successfully measuring and evaluating inter-firm
performance. Existing measures continue to capture intrafirm performance and focus on traditional
measures. The lack of a framework to simultaneously measure and translate inter-firm performance
into value creation has largely contributed to this situation. This article presents a framework that
overcomes these shortcomings by measuring performance across multiple firms and translating
supply chain performance into shareholder value.
INTRODUCTION
The ability to measure supply chain performance remains an elusive goal for managers in most
companies. Few have implemented supply chain management or have visibility of performance
across multiple companies (Supply Chain Solutions, 1998; Keeler et al., 1999; Simatupang and
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Sridharan, 2002). Supply chain management itself lacks a widely accepted definition (Akkermans,
1999), and many managers substitute the term for logistics or supplier management (Lambert and
Pohlen, 2001). As a result, performance measurement tends to be functionally or internally focused
and does not capture supply chain performance (Gilmour, 1999; Supply Chain Management, 200 I)
At best, existing measures only capture how immediate upstream suppliers and downstream
customers drive performance within a single firm.
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Developing and Costing Performance Measures
ABC is a technique for assigning the direct and indirect resources of a firm to the activities
consuming the resources and subsequently tracing the cost of performing these activities to the
products, customers, or supply chains consuming the activities (La Londe and Pohlen, 1996). An
activity-based approach increases costing accuracy by using multiple drivers to assign costs whereas
traditional cost accounting frequently relies on a very limited number of allocation bases.
y = d: - lax -
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